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CHARGE OF JUDGE ALLISON, IN THE CAME OF TllONAASWASHINGTON SMITH.'
GENTLEmEN OF THE juY: After a continuous session of two,
weeks, the case of the defendant is about to be handed over to you
for final judgment, as it has been given to you upon the evidence
and the argument of counsel representing both the Commonwealth
and the defendant. The Commonwealth's case, as they were
required to prove it to you, is briefly this: On the fourth day of
November last, about four o'clock, in the afternoon, Richard Carter
was seated in the front parlor of the St. Lawrence Hotel in this.
city, engaged in conversation with a nephew, when the defendant

entered and accosted him; the deceased then entered into a conversation with him, which lasted for a short time, when they both rose
from their seats, and the defendant, presenting a loaded pistol almost
in contact with the person of Richard Carter, shot him, discharging.
the contents of four barrels of his revolver into his body. The case
thus proved to you by the testimony of witnesses not in any way
impeached, or the truth of their statement denied, or even questioned by the defendant, relieves it from an embarrassment which
often renders difficult the solution of an issue which involves
Delivered Monday, January 8, 1858, in the Court of Oyor and Terminer.

17

CHARGE OF JUDGE ALLISON,

the guilt or innocence of one arraigned upon a charge of murder.
There is no such embarrassment here; the act is not only proved,
but is openly avowed; the defendant had no concealment when he
took the life of the deceased, neither has he had any concealment
here; and but for the fact that one charged with the highest crime
known to the law can waive none of his rights, he might as well
have dispensed with the formal proof submitted to you by the
Commonwealth, and, admitting the fact of the killing, at once placed
himself boldly upon his defence.
The case of the Commonwealth having been established by the
testimony of the eye-witnesses of the transaction, the defendant says,
and he asks you by your verdict to say for him, that he is not guilty
in manner and form as he stands indicted. This denial of his guilt
is based not upon an assertion that he did not shoot Richard Carter,
and thereby deprive him of life, but that at the time of the commisof the act he was an irresponsible being; that he was not a free
moral agent, that he had not such control over the faculties of the
mind as to hold him before the law to a responsibility for his acts,
and, therefore, he asks you to acquit him of the crime of murder.
It has been ruled in many cases, that the proper legal test of
criminal responsibility is the power to distinguish between right
and wrong-to determine whether the act was an offence against
law, human or divine. This definition has been so commonly
accepted, particularly by the English judges, as the correct one,
that it may be regarded as the most general standard by which
juries are directed to measure the degree of intellect and consequent
accountability of one charged with the commission of crime, where
the defence is insanity. And yet it has in many instances been
either totally repudiated as in .Haddon'scase, where Lord Erksine
induced the court to depart from the old test, and adopt that for
which he then so strenuously and successfully contended that insanity
consisted in the delusive sources of thought. Instead, therefore,
of making that kind of insanity which would exempt from punishment to consist in the absence of any of the intedectual faculties, he
lays down delusion as its true condition of tht: mind, of which the
criminal act must be its offspring. This test has also often been
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departed from in the recognition of the doctrine of moral insanity,
as applicable to the commission of crime, where the acts are not
done under the influence of an insane delusion as to existing. facts
or with an incapacity of knowing right from wrong, but where the
moral sentiments are entirely perverted, so that the defendant being
no longer left to the freedom of his will, by an irresistible impulse is
urged on to the commission of crime.
The great mistake which seems to have been made in attempting
to lay down a rule by which to settle the question of responsibility
for crime, with the greatest deference to the wisdom of those who
have sought to fix an arbitrary standard for its measurement, it is
suggested, consists in endeavoring to apply one rule to a disease, as
subtle in its character and as obscure in its hidden sources of thought
and action as it is variable in the types and forms which it assumes.
If insanity was always the same; if it was something uniform
and definite in its development; if you could mark out and define
with precision its properties and characteristics, then there would
seem to be wisdom in adjusting a rule which should know of no
variation, by which every one who offends against the law, and
who is alleged to have been insane at the time of the commission of
the act should be decided to be guilty or innocent. But so far is
this from being true, that the disease sometimes takes one form and
sometimes another, and each rule or test, with perhaps some modifications, is a true criterion of legal responsibility, according to the
form of insanity with which a person charged with crime is shown
to have been affected. It has been well said that "a man. having
the knowledge of right and wrong, and in the possession of the
power of choosing the one and refusing the other, is rightly held to
be responsible for his conduct to his God, his neighbor, and to himself. A man knowing and capable of discharging his duties to his
God, to his neighbor, and to himself, is a sane man. A man, who,
from any mental (or moral) imperfection or infirmity, is incapable
of discharging those duties, cannot be considered to be in a state of
mental (or moral) sanity, and cannot be held responsible to do that
which he is unable to do." The words "or moral," I have inserted,
which are, though in a restricted or qualified sense, necessary to a
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proper definition of insanity, by which to settle the question, for an
insane defendant, of his guilt or innocence.
The rule, therefore, upon which the Commonwealth insists, (where
there is neither delusion nor irresistible impulse,)-namely, that if,
at the time of the commission of the act, a defendant has sufficient
capacity to know whether his act is right or wrong, and whether it
is contrary to the law of the land, he is criminally responsible-is
undoubtedly correct, with this qualification, that he must have that
knowledge and power of discrimination with reference to the act
charged against him as a crime; for if sane upon other subjects, yet
of diseased or unsound mind upon the subject connected with his
offence, so that, as to it, he was incapable of judging whether it was
right or wrong, he could not be held accountable. The question
therefore, which the jury must determine, in every case in which
insanity is set up as a defence, is not, whether there is a total deprivation of ability to distinguish between good and evil, this being a
condition of mind that belongs only to idiocy, and not to insanity,
in the proper sense of the term, but whether as to the act which is
the subject of investigation before them, the defendant was sane or
insane. Upon many, or indeed upon most subjects, the mind may
be entirely sound, and, as to others, incapable of forming a single
correct conclusion; and it is not unfrequently the case that upon
such subjects insane persons possess the mental and moral faculties,
not only undiminished, but in many instances sharpened and
increased, so as to contemplate subjects in their true and ordinary
relations, to reason correctly, and even acutely; and properly to
distinguish as to many acts, whether their tendency be good or evil.
It therefore follows that without this modification of the rule, the
defence of insanity could never be successfully established, because
it cannot be truly said of any insane person, that upon some subjects
he could not distinguish between good or evil, and yet on others his
mind might be entirely at sea, affected and controlled by every
varying shade of thought and feeling, and thus impelled to the most
extreme and inconsistent action.
Mr. Ray, in his work on Medical Jurisprudence, says, " hat the
slightest acquaintance with the insane will convince any one of the

IN THE CASE OF T. W. SMITH.

261

truth of this position. In no school of logic, in no assembly of the
just, can we listen to closer and shrewder argumentation, to warmer
exhortations of duty, to more glowing descriptions of the beauty of
virtue, or more indignant denunciations of evil doing, than in the
hospitals and asylums of the insane. And yet many of these very
people make no sccret of entertaining notions utterly subversive of
all moral propriety, and are perhaps only waiting a favorable
opportunity to execute some project of wild and cruel violence."
Cunning and design are often manifested by insane persons in a high
degree. The case of Wiley Williams is an illustration. Re was an
inmate. of the Pennsylvania hospital for the insane, and, whilst
there, imbibed a deadly animosity toward the chief resident physician
of the institution; he managed to get out by scaling the wall, provided himself with a rifle, powder, and ball, returned to the hospital
and secreted himself among the branches of a tree, where he awaited
his opportunity, and deliberately fired at the man whom he desired
to destroy. I afterwards saw him, an inmate of a cell in our
penitentiary, where he was confined for safe keeping as a madman,
and where, I believe, he subsequently died. There are many cases
referred to in the books which illustrate this fact. In a note in
Chitty's Medical Jurisprudence, 861, is the case of a lady alleged
to be a lunatic, who was examined by a barrister for two hours, with
the appearance of excellent sense, high attainments, and accomplishment, which denoted her to be perfectly competent to take care of
herself and her property; but it was suggested to the barrister that
"ever since she had passed a certain house, nine years before, she
constantly insisted that a piece of wood was burning in her throat;
when it was suggested to her, she described the appearance of the
fire, supposed to be still burning, and stated that if she put her finger
to the root of her tongue, she felt that it was scorched.
Upon this question, therefore, you will be called upon to determine,
from the evidence, not only whether the defendant was generally or
totally insane, (for, if such is your opinion, you need push the inquiry
no further,) but whether, at the time of the commission of the offence,
he was of sound or unsound mind upon the subject connected with
his criminal act; and whether, under the influence of such a diseased
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state of mind, he shot the deceased, a large number of witnesses
have given their opinions to you, based on a personal knowledge of
facts which the law holds must in all instances (except in the case
of experts) first be given to the jury as the basis or foundation of an
opinion as to whether a prisoner was sane or insane at the time of
which the witnesses speak. The material question as to time, for
your consideration, is the mental condition of the defendant upon the
afternoon of the 4th of November last, when he shot Richard Carter,
for it is entirely immaterial to the issue whether the prisoner was
or was not insane before and after the commission of the act, if
the evidence satisfies you that the defendant, when he took the
life of the deceased, was possessed of a sound mind in relation to
the act for which he is now on trial before you. There is no question more difficult of solution than a disputed or questionable case
of insanity, and, therefore, the law allows of a wide range of evidence,
both as to time and as to the character of the evidence itself, to be
given to the jury to aid them in their search after the truth of the
issue, and where at best, there is generally so much groping in the
dark. To enable a jury, therefore, to feel their way, step by step,
to a correct conclusion, light is permitted to be shed upon their path
from points of time both prior and subsequent to the event, and the
testimony is important or valueless, as it affords you aid in the
solution of the problem which, by your verdict, you must determine.
These opinions to which I have referred, are in themselves, as
establishing insanity in the defendant at any point of time, to be
relied upon or rejected, as you believe them to be grounded upon
facts and have claim to consideration or otherwise, according to the
honesty, freedom from bias, intelligence and means of observation
possessed by the witnessess who have expressed such opinions in
your hearing. The propriety of allowing others than experts to
testify as to the mental condition of one on trial, has often been
gravely questioned; but the law seems now to be settled in favor of the
admission of such evidence, and, for myself, I would attach greater
weight to the judgment of an intelligent witness who speaks from
personal observation, than I would to that of an expert whose
opinion is founded on what he has heard from others. These opinions,
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as I have said, are to be tested solely by the facts upon which they
are based, and the intelligence and credibility of the witnesses, fortytwo of whom have said that, at different times between the first of July,
1857, and the twelfth of January, 1858, they believed the defendant
to have been insane; whilst, on the part of the Commonwealth,
ten persons have expressed a contrary judgment, several of whom
saw the defendant whilst in the very act of shooting the deceased,
and have described to you his appearance, behaviour, and conversation at the time, all of which, in their judgment, was consistent with
sanity, and, therefore, they believe, and have expressed that belief
to you, that Thomas Washington Smith, when he shot Richard Carter, was of sound mind. This is most important testimony, and
should be allowed its due weight, because it bears upon the precise
time at which you must say whether the defendant was accountable
or not. With this digression, which seemed to be necessary to
enable you the better to answer correctly the several propositions
involved in this discussion, we come back to the consideration of the
first, which requires you to settle what is the proper meaning of the
term-a sound mind.
Man is the masterpiece of that creative power which spake all
things into being, and a voice which comes down to us from above,
has said, that he is indeed fearfully and wonderfully made. This is
true, not only of his complicated, delicate physical organism, but to
a still greater degree is it true of that which distinguishes him above
all the creatures of God-his endowment with intellect or reason,
which we are accustomed to designate by the general term, mind.
Mind is possessed of a number of faculties, which together enable
us to judge of the mental condition of an individual, and when the
brain is in a healthy condition, these faculties operate together, so as
to produce what is termed a "sound mind ;" and, as you shall find
from the evidence, the possession, or want of possession by the
defendant, of those intellectual properties which are necessary to a
proper understanding of the act which he was about to perpetrate
and its consequences, upon the occasion when he deprived Richard
Carter of his life, you should convict or acquit the prisoner. It
was necessary that he should have been possessed of perception,.
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memory, and an ability to reason or form opinions and conclusions.
As applicable to the case under consideration, let us see how this
test applies. On the fourth day of November last, about four o'clock
in the afternoon, the prisoner entered the parlor of the St. Lawrence
Hotel, where he met the deceased. If at that time the powers of his
mind had been impaired to such a degree as to have rendered him
unable to fix his attention upon Richard Carter, or to distinguish
him from others who were then there, or, if able to recognize and
remember him, had not memory enough to connect him with the
cause of his trouble, or what ground of complaint he had against him,
he would be clearly wanting in those elements of a sound mind, the
possession of which is essential to a responsibility for crime. But
we must go one step further: conceding to the defendant the possession of these faculties upon the occasion referred to, did he also
possess the ability to reason upon the facts thus grouped together
in his mind? Was he able to draw correct deductions from these
premises, as connected with the act perpetrated by him ? If, fromthe evidence, you are satisfied that the defendant understood
correctly the relation in which he and Richard Carter stood to each
other-that be could reason correctly as to the consequences of his
deed, and knew that for such an act he must answer to the violated
law of the land-that it was a crime to take life under such circumstances, and knew that the act he was about to perpetrate was a
wrongful act, and that he was not laboring under a delusion or a
coerced will-then it follows that he possessed a sound mind as to
the crime charged against him, and to all its legal consequences, he
ought to be required to respond, and from that responsibility no
degree of hardship endured by him, no amount of sympathy for his
terrible and wholly unmerited suffering should be allowed to exonerate
him at the hands of the jury, who have sworn to pass upon the
question of his guilt or innocence, according to the evidence, and
.to be controlled in their verdict by no other consideration whatever.
The second ground upon which the jury would be justifiable in
rendering a verdict of not guilty is, where life is taken under the
influence of a delusion, or an hallucination, which, if a reality, would
be a defence to the commission of the act, and where one so deluded
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is not otherwise insane. This was one of the questions which was
answered by the English judges, and the answer was substantially
as I have stated the principle to be. To apply it to the present
case, the following would hold true: If a belief had fastened itself
upon the mind of the defendant, which to him had become a firm
and fixed reality, although in truth but a pure delusion, that Richard
Carter entertained the design of taking his life upon the first favor_
able opportunity, that he had persons employed to watch his movements, to follow him as he passed along the streets and whilst
attending to his business, seeking to accomplish his end by stealth
and strategy, and that Carter was himself superintending these
operations, and was here directing the movements of his emissaries,
and that it was absolutely necessary that he should destroy the life
of Carter in order to save his own life, he would not be guilty before
the law, and should be acquitted of the charge laid against him.
If, however, it is sought to excuse the act on the ground of delusion or "monomania" upon the one subject, you should be satisfied
not on that delusion existed in the mind of the prisoner, but that the
act was connected with the delusive sources of thought; and that it
was of such a character that, if true, it would be a good and valid
defence for taking the life of a fellow-being. If, however, the delusion extended no further than to the belief of a design to annoy the
defendant, by persons who followed him in order to keep Carter
informed of his doings, this would not be a good defence, if he was
otherwise sane; for, if a reality, it would not justify the taking of
life. A striking illustration of this proposition occured but a little
more than a year ago; I refer to the case of the celebrated Hugh
Miller, of Scotland, one of the most remarkable men of his age, who
from an humble laborer in the stone quarries of his native land, by
dint of his own efforts and a massive intellect but rarely equaled,
rose in the confidence and esteem of his countrymen, until Chalmers
himself designated him the greatest Scotchman alive after the death
of Sir Walter Scott. He was a man not only of the strictest
integrity, and of the highest attainments in science, but in his
religious principles, in the exercise of an unwavering faith and trust
in God, he was as firm as the old red sand-stones of his native hills,
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whose mysteries he was the first to unfold to the world. Yet this
man, from over-much brain work, became subject to the most terrible
mental suffering, until reason abandoned her throne, and this great
light of science went out forever. He became impressed with the
belief that he would be attacked on the highway, and that his museum,
the labor of a lifetime, was exposed to the assaults of burglars.
Under this impression, he armed himself for defence. At night,
impressed with the belief that his museum had been attacked by
robbers, he would arm himself with his pistol, and rush to its defence.
Now, supposing that upon any one of these occasions, he had encountered some member of his own family, and believing him to be one
of the imaginary persons who had broken into his premises, had
shot him, would any one for a moment suppose that for so doing he
ought to be convicted of murder? Certainly not: because that
belief was a reality to Hugh Miller, and if it had been, instead of a
delusion, an actual fact to take life under such circumstances, would
have been justifiable. His form of disease was "monomania,"
which is the manifestation of the unsoundness of mind upon one
subject. It has been contended for the defendant at the bar, not
only that he was generally insane, so as to take away criminal
responsibility, but that, if the jury are not satisfied of this as a fact,
that by.the evidence he is clearly shown to have been, on the subject
of his domestic difficulties, a "monomaniac."
Such is the testimony
of Dr. Clapp; several others have also given the same opinion.
But if you concur in this judgment as to the true state of his mental
condition, whether the act perpetrated by him under an insane
delusion can be excused upon the principle as I have stated it; you
must determine. That the defendant Aid, to some extent, labor
under an illusion or hallucination, is very clearly established by the
evidence; but its extent and character you must ascertain.
There can be no room for doubt of his belief in the statements
made to two witnesses that he encountered a spy of Carter's upon
the public grounds at Washington; to others that he was beset by
them upon the streets of this city, watched when he entered into
conversation upon the subject of his troubles; calling Mr. Campbell's
attention to one of them running up an alley, and that all this was
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an annoyance, a source of trouble and vexation, and perhaps of fear
to him, cannot very well be doubted. But whether it created a well
founded apprehension of peril to life, is a question for your determination. The occurrence at Front and Walnut streets, would seem to
favor this idea; when he heard the voice of his foe, by which term he
generally designated Carter, calling from the carriage to his spies,
"Shoot, shoot, shoot !" this he thought to be an attempt upon his
life, for he said he gathered his coat about him, and determined to
take it like a brave man. You must say whether all the testimony
upon this point satisfies you that he killed Car-ter under a delusive
belief that it was necessary for his own protection; if you are
satisfied of this fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it;
but if you are not, it will not justify you in rendering a verdict of
"not guilty," if you find that he was otherwise sane, and was in the
possession of a free will.
The third ground of defence is, that Thomas Washington Smith
was not, upon the day of the murder, a free and accountable agent;
that owing to the diseased condition of his mind, he was unable
longer to control his will; that with him, the act of killing Richard
Carter was an uncontrollable impulse; that he no longer had the
power of choosing between peace and war to the death with his foe;
that he was pressed on to the commission of his act by a controlling
influence which to him was an overpowering necessity. If this has
been established to your satisfaction, it would excuse the defendant.
A defence of this character requires, however, to be examined with
the greatest care, nor should it be relied upon unless established by
the clearest proof. That there is a moral or homicidal insanity
cannot be well questioned at the present day, which is characterized
by Judge Gibson in Commonwealth vs. .Morler,to be an irresistible
inclination to kill or to commit some other particular offence. There
may, says the learned judge, be an unseen ligament pressing on the
"mind, and drawing it to a consequence which it sees, and cannot
avoid, and placing it under a coercion which, while its results are
clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance. As applicable to the
present case, I adopt my language used on the trial of Isaac C
Shurlock for murder about one year since; "in order to justify a
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verdict of acquittal upon this ground, you must find that the defendant, although conscious of the act he was about to perpetrate and
its consequences, yet governed by an uncontrollable impulse, his
will no longer in subjection to his reason, owing to the excited and
continued impetuosity of his thoughts; the confused condition of a
mind enfeebled by disease, and goaded by a sense of grievous wrong;
that he was wrought up to a frenzy bordering upon madness, which
rendered him unable to control his actions or direct his movements;"
if the tempest of grief and passion which swept over Thomas W.
Smith, and prostrated the strong man, so that he had no longer the
control of his will, he is not responsible to the law for his acts; but
if he was possessed of this restraining power,.sufiicient if called into
exercise, to stay the hand which took the life of Richard Carter,
and the defendant were otherwise sane to a degree of responsibility
for crime, then he is guilty of the offence charged against him, and
ought to be convicted of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.
This doctrine should, however, be received in all cases with caution,
lest every inclination to do evil be-set up as an excuse for crime,
and every perversion of the moral sentiment be made to serve as a
shield against punishment for a violation of law. Nothing could be
fraught with greater danger to the peace and safety of society than
the recognition of the doctrine that a perverted or disordered state
of the affections or moral state of the mind, should afford an immunity
from punishment. If it amounts to anything short of an absolute
dispossession of the free and natural agency of the mind, it should
be discarded as having no value as a defence.
All the evidence which has been offered by the defendant, in
support of the plea of insanity, is to be taken into consideration in
passing upon this issue, which the defendant has raised in the cause;
but that which is most important will be found in the testimony of
Mr. Joseph P. Brinton, when, after describing one of his interviews
with the defendant, about two weeks before the occurrence at the
St. Lawrence Hotel, he tells you that the defendant took from his
pockets a pistol and a hunting-knife; that, seeing that the pistol was
loaded, he took hold of the weapons and took them from him; that
the defendant made no resistance, let him have them, and that he
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locked them in a drawer. He says the defendant seemed to struggle for a moment to collect himself, and then said, "That is right,
Mr. Brinton; take them and keep them, and don't give them to me,
if I come here afid beg you for them, until you know that I am
going to leave the city; for if I meet that man I am afraid ll
shoot him."
The testimony of Mr. Henry C. Townsend bears upon the same
point, having said to the defendant, in reply to a remark that he
ought to hold Carter responsible, that such a course would not be
proper, he answered, that " God would smile on me for ridding the
earth of such a monster."
But it will be your duty to take these declarations of the prisoner,
not standing by themselves, but in connection with all that was
testified to by these gentlemen, and say whether, supported by the
remaining portions of their evidence, and the testimony of the other
witnesses examined in your hearing, you can satisfy your consciences
that the mind of the prisoner was such a wreck that he had no
control over his actions, and that he was urged on to the commission
of the fatal deed by this irresistible impulse, which he was powerless
to withstand. Both Mr. Brinton and Mr. Townsend speak of
declarations made by the defendant which show a design to inflict
punishment upon Carter; to Mr. Townsend he said, "I have sent
him word to arm himself, and be prepared to give me that satisfaction due to a man of honor for so foul a wrong." To Mr. Brintorr
he said, "I'll shoot him, if you think, according to the code, I ought
to do so, and that his friends at the South would laugh at him if he
did not." These declarations would seem to favor the allegation
that this was all the result of deliberation and design ; but even such
deliberation is not inconsistent with a resistless impulse, or the
existence of an unseen ligament, as Judge Gibson characterized it,
which impels or draws one thus situate on to a fate as certain as
destiny itself; but whether the defendant was thus situate, you by
your verdict must answer.
The issue, gentlemen of the jury, which the defendant raises by
his plea, is one which he cannot leave to uncertainty or doubt.
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The presumption is always in favor of sanity; sanity is the rule, and
insanity the exception. The evidence of actual insanity, which has
been given to you at such unusual length, you must examine in its
detail; and if it leads you to a conclusion that, in either or all of.
the forms to which I have alluded, the defendant was of unsound
mind, you should acquit him of the crime of murder; but if, on the
contrary, you believe, judging from the evidence in the cause, that
although' insane at other times than the afternoon of the 4th of
November last, he was then in the possession of his reasoning faculties, so as to determine upon the act perpetrated by him; that he
was not laboring under a delusion, and was a free moral agent, then
you should not shrink from the discharge of your whole duty, and
render a verdict of guilty.
In passing upon this question, it is proper I should call your
attention to that portion of the testithony which relates to hereditary
insanity, which, sfanding by itself, does not prove any thing, but as
-showing the source and origin of the disease in one alleged to be of
unsound mind, supported by testimony of the actual derangement
in a defendant charged with the commission of crime, as corroborating and stregthening such evidence, it is certainly of some value,
for it may explain that which would otherwise be doubtful and
uncertain to the jury. Insanity is a disease, resulting, in most
instances, from physical causes, and is capable of transmission, and
is in many instances handed down from generation to generation.
But you must not infer the defendant to be insane because it has
been proved that some of his ancestors were of unsound mind; it
may shed light upon an issue such as that which you are now trying,
but as original testimony, and standing .by itself, it is of little value.
The judge called the attention of the jury to the degrees of
murder, and instructed them that if they found the defendant guilty,
they must specify the degree.
He also called their attention to the 28th section of the Act of
13th June, 1836, which requires that in every case in which it
shall be given in evidence, upon the trial of any one charged with
any crime or misdemeanor, that such person was insane at the time
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of the commission of such offence, and such person shall be acquitted,
the jury shall be required to find specially whether such person was
insane at the time of the commission of such offence, and to declare
whether such person was acquitted by them on the ground of such
insanity.
Upon the question of character, the judge said the defendant has
proved a character of which any man might well be proud; he was
high toned, honest, pure, peaceful, gentle; this was the uniform,
unbroken chain of testimony upon this branch of the defence. The
value of it conisists solely in its bearing upon the question of the
probability of a man thus disposed taking the law into his own bands,
and ithbruing those hands in the blood of a fellow-being, if he were
sane. In a doubtful case upon the question of the guilt or innocence of one charged with a violation of the law of the land, character
was often of great value, settling with the jury the question in favor
of a defendant, and securing his acquittal. In this case, however,
where the defence is insanity, it bears upon probabilities alone; and
in an issue where the defendant is bound to establish his plea by
competent proof, it is entitled to some weight, and that the jury
will doubtless give to it in making up their verdict from all the
testimony in the cause.
In conclusion, gentlemen of the jury, permit me, for but one
moment, before handing the case over to you for final disposition,
to call your attention to the true question in the cause. It is not
whether Richard Carter inflicted wrong upon the defendant, or
upon the defendant's wife-that is not an issue here; and you should
guard yourselves against being led away from the proper discharge
of your duty and induced to base your verdict upon a false foundation. We have not Richard Carter on trial, nor are his acts, in
any sense, properly in the cause, except for the purpose of showing
to what extent the revelation of those acts made to the defendant
affected his mind, and what agency they had in overthrowing his
reason, if you believe such result was produced by these causes alone,
or in connection with others.
We all, in a cause like the present one, have reason to guard
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ourselves against yielding to the influence of the tender and kindly
feelings, which it is impossible to restrain in behalf of one as worthy,
and yet as unfortunate, as Thomas W. Smith. Feel for him in his
deep distress; pour, if you can, the oil of consolation into his broken,
bleeding heart; do all that you properly can do, to lift him from
the dust; but, gentlemen, remember that you have a solemn duty
to perform, and that is, to pass impartially, between the Commonwealth and the prisoner at the bar; let your verdict rest upon the
evidence, and not upon feeling or outside influence. It is my duty
to say to you, that if Richard Carter had inflicted, all the injury
upon the prisoner which he supposed him to have done, still it could
not justify the crime laid to his charge. To concede this right to
any one is to invest 'him with the right of determining upon the guilt of
the accused, making for himself a law to meet his own case, settling
the extent of the punishment, and carrying into execution his own
decree. This is subversive of law and order; it is unsettling the
foundations upon which society rests; and no such right can be
conceded to any one, no matter how deeply he has been wronged.
Gentlemen, remember your solemn obligations, and that you
must answer for the proper discharge of your duties to another
tribunal than that of public opinion. You have called upon your
God to witness that you will not be recreant to your trust; and in
fulfilment of that vow, if you believe the defendant to have been of
sound mind on the 4th of November last, when he shot RichardCarter, convict him; if, however, you believe him to have been
insane, acquit him. Let your verdict be the honest expression of
your opinion, based upon the evidence in the cause; whether that
verdict shall release the defendant from his present unfortunate
position, or consign him to a felon's doom.'
For the Commonwealth, DistrictAttorneys Mann and Louglhead.
For the prisoner, Messrs. D. -P. Brown and 1[ R-ussell Thayer.

I The prisoner was acquitted.
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In the United States Circuit Court for the District of -iissouri,
April Term, 1 8 57.-n Admiralty.
HILL & CONN vs. THE GOLDEN GATE-JOHNSON ET AL. VS. THE AbIBAS.
SADOR.

1. It is settled that there can be no lien by the general maritime law for materials
or supplies furnished a ship in the home port.
2. Hill vs. The Golden Gate, 5 Am. L. R. 142, opinion by Wells, J., affirmed.
3. A judicial sale, in a proceeding in rein, will discharge maritime liens, whether
general or statutory, in whatever jurisdiction it may be decreed.
4. The operation of the Boat Acts, on the Western rivers, considered. The cases cited
and commented on.
5. The foreign or domestic character of a vessel must be determined by the residence
of her owners.
6. If a vessel is navigated by charterers, -who have exclusive control of her, they
are to be deemed the owners pro hac vice.
7. A general maritime lien cannot be divested by the legislature of a State.
8. An admiralty sale alone can judicially pass a title to a vessel, discharged of liens.

The opinion of the Court, in which the facts are fully stated, was
delivered by
TREAT, D. J., Mr. Justice CATRON concurring in the result.These cases are appeals in admiralty. As they involve, to some
extent, the same legal propositions, they will be considered together.
The Golden Gate was owned in Indiana, enrolled in Kentucky,
and chartered in Missouri. By the terms of the charter-party, the
exclusive management and control, as well as the profits,' of the
vessel, were vested in the charterers. Whilst the latter were
engaged in navigating her, the libellants furnished, at St. Louis, the
supplies in question. After these supplies were furnished, the vessel
was seized under the Missouri Boat Act, and the claimant became
the purchaser at the judicial sale ordered by the St. Louis Court of
Common Pleas. The libellants did not present their demand for
allowance by said court pursuant to the Boat Act.
The Ambassador was enrolled at Cincinnati, and her owner resided
at Newport, in Kentucky, on the opposite side of the Ohio river.
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All of the business of the vessel was transacted by him in Cincinnati, of which the town of Newport, although in another State, is,
in business matters, practically a suburb. The libellants' demand
is for labor and materials furnished in Cincinnati. This vessel had
been sold under a decree in admiralty, by the United States District Court of Ohio, and, according to the terms of sale, the United
States marshal had taken of the purchasers a mortgage to secure
the time payments. The mortgagee and purchasers put in answers and claims. The demand of the libellants accrued after said
sale and mortgage.
The well-considered and elaborate opinion of Judge Wells, in
deciding the cases of the Golden Gate, in the District Court, (since
published in 5th vol. of American Law Register, 142 and 148, and
in Newberry's Ad. Reports, 296 and 308,) leaves but little to be
added concerning the propositions there ably discussed by him.
His clear and exhausting review of the authorities upon those points
renders it unnecessary to repeat or re-examine them. It will be
sufficient now, so far as those propositions are concerned, to state
the conclusions at which this court has arrived, and to present some
of the more obvious reasons on which those conclusions are based.
It has been settled, and is therefore not open for review in this
court, that there can be no lien, by the general maritime law, for
materials or supplies furnished a vessel in her home port. (le
General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 443; Peyroux vs. Howard, 7 Peters,
343; Steamboat Orleans vs. Phcebus, 11 Peters, 175; New Jersey
Steam Navigation Company vs. Merchants' Bank, 6 Howard, 890;
Pratt et al. vs. Reed, 19 Howard, 859.) It is admitted by the
learned advocates, that the libellants have a lien by the general
maritime law, if the home port of the Golden Gate was Louisville,
Kentucky, (the place of enrolment,) or in Indiana, (the residence of
her general owners; and if the home port of the Ambassador was
in Kentucky, (the residence of her owner at the time the repairs
were furnished her at Cincinnati.) The first question, therefore, to
be decided is, as to the home port of the Golden Gate-whether the
supplies by the libellant were furnished to a dbmestic or foreign
vessel. If St. Louis was her home port, then the libellants have no
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maritime lien; and the local lien given by the Missouri statute
"concerning boats and vessels," has been lost, if the judicial proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas divests or extinguishes the
local or statutory liens created by that act.
By the United States statutes, (Acts of Dec. 31, 1842, and of
Feb. 18, 1798, &c.,) a vessel must be enrolled or registered as of
the port at or nearest to which her owners, or managing owner
resides, and the enrollment must state the residence of her owners.
Hence the courts have held, according to a recognized rule in analogous cases, that the residence of the owners, as stated in the enrollment, is prima facie correct. It is not the port of enrollment that
deteribines the character of the vessel, but the residence of the
owners, and the enrollment is primafacie evidence of the latter fact.
Where the enrollment, therefore, states the residence of the owners
to be in another State, the vessel primafacie belongs to that other
State. If the enrollment misstates the fact, the character of the
vessel is not concluded by that misstatement, but the truth may be
given in evidence for the benefit of the parties interested. The
United States statutes are framed to meet the fact that the necessities of commerce have not required the establishment of ports of
enrollment at every town or village, either on the sea-coast or navigable rivers of the Union, and consequently the owners of vessels
may often reside at towns where there are no such established ports,
or even in towns remote from navigation. The reason of the maritime rule with regard to liens, requires a disclosure of the residence
of owners, and the policy of the United States laws also demands
the enrollment or register of vessels used in the coasting or foreign
trade. Documents required by law are presumed to give accurate
statements of what the law requires them to authenticate.
As it is admitted that neither the charterers nor general owners
of the Golden Gate had any credit in St. Louis, that the supplies
were necessary for the running of the vessel, and that, consequently,
there was a necessity for relying on the credit of the vessel, within
the rule laid down in Prattet al. vs. Reed, 19 How. 859, the right
of the ]ibellants to recover depends on the decision of the question,
whether the residence of the general owners, or of the charterers,
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under the facts in evidence, determines the character of the vessel.
The District Court held that, as the charterers were residents of
St. Louis, and the supplies were furnished there for the purpose of
victualling the vessel, St. Louis must be considered her home port
with respect to this transaction.
. The case of Pree vs. The Indiana, (Crabbe, 479,) sheds no light
on the question; for it merely recognizes the rule, already stated,
with regard to the primafacie effect of an enrollment. The contract
was made with the charterers. An action at common law would lie
directly against them upon the contract. They were alone interested
in the profits of the voyage, had the control of the vessel, and could
make contracts for running her. It is true, liens may attach, for
certain purposes, under the general maritime law, notwithstanding
the charter party, and the vessel will be held thereby against the
general and special owners, or she may be hypothecated, in specified
emergencies, either by the master or by the charterers; but the
special owners or charterers will be none the less liable, in the first
instance, on all contracts made by them, or made on their account,
for running her on the prescribed voyage. They had the sole right
to appoint the master, determine the voyage, order the stores, select
the crew and receive the freight money. No one would, if applied
to by them for supplies, wait for the assent of the general owners,
or think he was dealing with the latter. If they were known to
him, and were of undoubted responsibility, he would deal with them
without looking further; and if they were insolvent, or in doubtful
circumstances, he would refuse to supply the stores ordered by them.
He would treat them in all respects, pro hac vice, as the only
owners with whom he had to deal. They would be liable to him on
their contract; and at common law he would proceed directly against
them. They are the immediate parties to the contract-not the
general owners. Hence it has been frequently decided, both by
common law and admiralty courts, that supplies for a ship are furnished on the credit of the master and owner when ordered by the
master, but when the ship is out of the employment, or entirely
beyond the control and management of the general ownar, the charterer, whether under a parol or written contract, is hold therefor,
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and not the general owner. Frazer vs. Marsh, 13 East, 238;
Reeve vs. Davis, 1 Ad. & El. 312; Cutter vs. Thurlo, 20 Maine,
217; Thompson vs. liamilton, 12 Pick. 428; Mulden vs. Whitlock, 1 Cowen, 290; .anter vs. feolmes, 10 Metcalf, 402; WNiclkerson vs. Schooner Monsoon, 5 Law Rep. 416; The Nathaniel
Hooper, 8 Sumner, 575; 8'kolfleld vs. Potter, Davies' Rep. 392;
Schooner Volunteer, 1. Sumner, 551; Gracie vs. Palmer, 8 Wheat.
632; Phillipsvs. Sedley, 1 Wash. 0. 0. 226; Fisher vs. Willing,
8 Serg. & R. 118; Certain Logs of Ml~ahogany, 2 Sumner, 589.
If, then, the charterer is primarily liable, and the general owner
is no party to the contract-if the former is owner for the voyage,
why sliould not his residence be her home port for the voyage?
Weaver vs. S. C. Owens, Wallace, jun., 359; Drinewater vs.
Spartan, Ware, 155; The Phebe, Ware, 265. As under the navigation acts and ordinances of most nations, the general owners and
charterers must necessarily be of the same country, this question
would not be likely to arise in those countries; and we are not
aware that it has ever been expressly adjudicated, except by the
District Court, in this case. It must therefore be considered in the
light of established principles, and by rules fairly deducible therefrom. The point is not, whether an existing maritime lien binds
the vessel as against the owners, when the contract is made by the
charterer, or whether supplies furnished a vessel, when out of the
employment of the general owner and in a foreign port, give a
maritime lien; but whether the port where the supplies are furnished
is, pro hac vice, a foreign port, so that a maritime lien exists therefor, at all, as against either the charter or the general owner. To
determine whether a maritime lien exists at all, in this case, the
residence of the owners must be ascertained; that is, the residence
of the owners for the time being. If the dealings and personal
credit, primarily, would be with the special owner, then his residence
ought to be considered the home port, within the spirit of the maritime rule; or otherwise, the reasons on which that rule is founded,
would cease altogether, viz: that a lien is given because there is a
necessity for relying upon the credit of the vessel itself, the solvency
or responsibility of the contracting party being unknown, and his
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residence being beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts of
the country where the supplies are furnished. And further, as the
charterer, and not the general owner, is personally responsible for
the supplies, it is his solvency and residence that are alone to be
regarded. It is therefore considered by this court, that the decision
of. the District Court on this point is correct; that under a full
charter-party, the residence of the charterers, quoad all contracts
for supplies of the kind named, during its continuance, is the home
port of the vessel. The libellants had, therefore, no maritime lien
when their lilel was filed in this case. The Missouri statute had
given them a local lien, which, still existing, would be enforced in
admiralty; but that lien was extinguished by the proceedings,
under that statute, in the Court of Common Pleas. They did not
prosecute their claim before that court, according to the statute,
against the funds arising from the judicial sale of the vessel; and,
by the terms of the Missouri act, said sale divested all local liens
created by the act, and the purchaser (who is the claimant here)
took the vessel, discharged of all Missouri liens. "When any boat
or vessel shall be sold, under the eleventh section of this act, the
officer making the sale shall execute to the purchaser a bill of sale
therefor, and such boat or vessel shall, in the hands of the purchaser
and his assigns, be free from and discharged from all previous liens
and claims under this act." (Section 13, of the Missouri "Act concerning Boats and Vessels," approved March 26th, 1845.)
In the case of the Ambassador, the owner resided in Newport,
Kentucky, opposite Cincinnati, Ohio, where the boat was enrolled.
Ie was an officer on the boat, and transacted the business of the
boat in Cincinnati. Cincinnati was the port nearest his residencethe place where he was to be found for business purposes. Newport
is substantially suburban, for business transactions, to Cincinnati;
and although in different States, separated from each other by the
Ohio river, they are so intimately connected in maritime or commercial matters, as to constitute one port within the maritime rule
governing the character of a vessel. The solvency of the owner may
be presumed to be as well known at his place of business as on the
other side of the ferry, and he was constantly, oi almost daily,
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within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ohio courts. The general
rule, that the ports of one State are foreign to the ports of all other
States, must not be held to mean that a port on one side of a river
which is the dividing line of two States, is necessarily limited in its
extent, and for all purposes, to the side of the river where the main
business of the port is done ; for it frequently happens, that the
port nearest to the owner is in another State; and by the collection
and enrollment laws of the United States, the business of the boat,
under those laws, must be transacted at the custom house of said
nearest port; that, for all port purposes, under the United States
statutes, said nearest port includes the residence of the owner; that
the place of the owner's residence and of his business are substantially the same, and are included within the true meaning of the
port where the enrollment is made. In this case, the evidence would
justify the conclusion, perhaps, that the residence of the owner was
upon the boat; but assuming the facts to be, that Cincinnati was
his place of business, and that his residence was on the opposite
side of the ferry, inasmuch as the enrollment was at Cincinnati, and
the business, both of the boat and of her owners, was done in that
city, and as Newport is substantially a suburb of Cincinnati, the
home port of the vessel is held to be Cincinnati. The lien, therefore, of these libellants, if they have any, must be by force of the
laws of Ohio. By those laws it was essential to a lien, that a libellant's demand should be sworn to and recorded, within four months
from the time it accrued. (Swan's Revised Statutes of Ohio, pp.
551, et seq.) No sworn account was filed by them for record, as
required, and they have no lien, therefore, under the Ohio law.
The argument, that as the work done on this vessel added to her
value, and thereby benefited both the owner and mortgagee, and
that, as the work might have been made a lien on the vessel, the
case should be considered as falling within the rule, that courts of
admiralty will take cognizance of demands which, in their inception,
were liens, is evidently misapplied here.
Admiralty courts have no general chancery powers. Dean vs.
Bates, 2 Wood. & M. 89; 2 Curtis, 82; 11 Pet. 175; 3 Howard,
568; Olcott's Rep. 387; 3 Hazzard, 129; 1 Vesey, Sr., 154.
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They will not notice the claims of general creditors of the owners,
or parties in interest. The Flora. Findley, 1 Hazz. 808. The
work in question was not done at the instance of the mortgagee,
nor was there, at any time, a lien therefor upon the boat. The
mortgagee, out of possession, would not have been personally liable
for those repairs, even if made in a foreign port. They were not
ordered by him, and they were not necessary for the preservation
of his security. .Xclntyre vs. Scott, 8 Johns. 159; Philli2s vs.
Sedley, 1 Wash. 226; Brooks vs. Bondsey, 17 Pick. 441 ; Lord
vs. Ferguson, 9 N. H. 880; Birbeck vs. "Tucker, 2 Hall, 121.
The propositions already cited are conclusive against the libellants in each of these cases, without considering the more important
question presented both to this court and to the District Court, and
ably discussed by the learned judge of the latter court in his published opinion. But as there are other cases awaiting the decision
of that question, and which stand upon an agreement to abide the
decision of these cases upon the effect of judicial proceedings and
sales of vessels by the State courts under State laws, it is proper
for us to consider that subject at this time. To understand properly the Missouri decisions cited in argument, reference must be
had to the different Missouri statutes under which these decisions
were made. The act of 1885 declares that "every boat or -vessel
used in navigating the waters of this State shall he liable,first, for
all debts contracted," &c., &c., and that "any person having, a
demand as aforesaid, instead of proceeding for the recovery thereof
against the master, owner, agent or consignee of a boat or vessel,
may, at his option, institute suit against such boat or vessel, by
name." That act made no provisions for settling or marshalling
the various demands recognized, nor directing any other than the
usual course of proceedings upon common law judgments, except
that the final process was an order of the court for the sale of the
boat or vessel for the judgment and costs. It required that order
to be executed and returned by the sheriff, in the same manner as
executions. When a suit was instituted under the act, a warrant
for the arrest of the boat or vessel issued, in the first instance, and
the sheriff detained the boat or vessel until the final order of th-
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court, unless she was previously discharged by giving the bond prescribed therefor by statute. In the case of Dobyns vs. The Sheriff
of S. Louis, 5 Mo. Rep. 256, it was held that the act of 1835 gave
no lien upon the boat. A suit had been commenced by attachment
on the 31st day of October, 1837, against the owners of that boat,
and the boat levied upon, according to the provisions of the attachment act. Said suit was prosecuted to judgment. On the 11th of
November, 1837, a suit was instituted against the boat, by name,
under the act of 1835, and soon thereafter three additional suits
were commenced under the same act, in all of which judgments were
rendered for the complainants. The boat was sold under an order
of couit, granted in the last named cases. The plaintiffs in the
attachment suit claimed the proceeds of said sale, and the court
ordered the sheriff to pay them over to said plaintiffs. The
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the decision of the court below,
holding that the act of 1835 gave no lien upon the boat to the
creditor, that it merely provided for suits against boats, .y name,
in order to facilitate the collection of demands enumerated in the
statute, and the levy of the writ of attachment fastened a lien upon
the vessel, which must be satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale
before the judgments rendered in the other suits.
The act of 1835 was amended in 1839, so as to make the demands
enumerated a lien; but no provisions were made for settling priorities or distributing the proceeds of the sale among the different lien
creditors. In the Gen. Brady vs. Buckly & Bandolph, 6 Mo.
558, the court held that the purchaser at the sale under the order
of the court, as provided by the boat act, took her discharged of all
liens, and not subject to the lien demands existing prior to those
upon which the judgment was rendered, and that preference was to
be given to the most diligent. A similar question to that often discussed in admiralty courts was presented for adjudication-whether
the right of the material man was Jus in re or Jus ad rem. If the
furnishing of supplies named in the act gave a lien upon the boat,
and other liens subsequently arose under the same act, would it not
follow that the last liens were subject to the prior ones ? As no
provision was made whereby all the lien creditors could be cited
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before the court, when a boat was ordered to be sold, and compelled
to litigate their demands against the proceeds of the sale-and as
the statute was silent concerning priorities and the mode of divesting statutory liens-the State courts were necessarily embarrassed
with the conflicting rights springing from that imperfect act. The
rule was adopted, therefore, that a judicial sale under said act discharged all prior liens, and that the demands of those who first
commenced suit were entitled to preference, or, in other words, that
" priority of levy under the act, and not of time when the respective
demands accrued, determined the right of preference. In the
steamboat Charlotte vs. John R. Hammond, 9 Mo. 58, it was ruled
that the lien given by the statute was independent of possession,
and that whoever purchased a vessel of the owners, took her subject
to all existing statutory liens, whether he had notice thereof or not.
In the Steamboat Raritan vs. J. G. Smith, 10 Mo. Rep. 527,
it was decided that the classes of demands mentioned in the statute
were entitled to priority according to their respective numbers.
That boat had been sold under a judgment had on a demand of the
first class, and the question for adjudication was, whether a judicial
sale divested all liens of the same and of inferior classes. The
court, after distinctly stating the difficulties presented by the imperfect provisions of the act, and announcing the maritime rules in
similar cases, decided that the purchaser took the vessel free from
all liens, and added the remark,-"1 It should be borne in mind, in
considering these questions, that a proceeding in rem against a boat
is not the only remedy a creditor is allowed by law. He may sue
those who were owners at the time the debt was contracted, or to
whom the credit was given." It was also held, in the Steamboat
lBaritan vs. Pollard,10 Mo. 583, that the boat act did not extend
"1to contracts not made in this State, and to vessels not employed
in the navigable waters of the State."
In Finney . Lee vs. The Steamboat Fayette, 10 Mo. 612, the
Supreme Court of Missouri had before them a question broader
than the interpretation of the Missouri statute and the effect of
judicial proceedings under it. In that case the complainant had a
demand against the boat, within the provisions of the Missouri act,
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and the defence was-that, subsequent to the date of the last item
in said demand, said boat had been seized and sold under a similar
act of Illinois, and that the present owner became the purchaser at
that judicial sale.
It was contended that, by the sale in Illinois, all prior liens existing under the Missouri as well as Illinois statute, were divested,
and, therefore, the complainant could not proceed against the boat,
by name. A demurrer to the plea was overruled by the court
below, and the case taken to the Supreme Court on a writ of error,
where it was decided that "this case is similar in principle to that
of the Steamboat Baritan vs. Smith, decided at the present term
of this'court. It was there determined that the rules of the maritime law were, in proceedings against steamboats, to govern, when
there was a failure of statutory regulations. Maritime liens in
respect to the mode in which they may be discharged, vary from
other liens. A judicial sale will divest them in whatever jurisdiction it may be decreed."
The operation of the boat acts of 1835 and of 1839, and also of
1845, were held in the case of N7 oble vs. Steamboat St. Anthony,
12 Mo. 261; Twitchell vs. The Hiissouri, 12 Mo. 412 ; Fisk vs.
The Forest City, 18 Mo. 587; and James vs. The Pawnee, 19
Mo. 517; to be as adjudicated in the prior case of the .aritan vs.
Pollard,10 Mo, 583, viz: not to embrace contracts made out of
the State, or to extend to boats not used in navigating the waters
of the State.
By the Missouri statute of 1845, the defects of prior acts were
remedied to some extent. That statute expressly declared the rule
of priorities, and provided for bringing in all lien creditors named
in the act, to assert their rights to a distributive share of the proceeds of the judicial sale of the boat. In The Sea Bird vs.
Beehier, 12 Mo. 569, the defence to a suit under the boat act was,
that subsequent to the accruing of the demand sued on, the boat
had been sold under judicial proceedings in Louisiana, according to
the provisions of the statutes of that State. It was held, that the
judicial sale in question did not divest the complainant's lien under
the Missouri act. The court adhered to its former decision, how-
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ever, "that a judicial sale under our law as it now stands, or under
the law of a sister State of a similar character, would convey a
title clear of all prior liens, there can be no question ;" and then
distinguished the judicial sale in Louisiana from judicial sales under
statutes similar to those of Missouri and Illinois. It says: "But
if we carry the principle further, and hold that a sale in Louisiana
in an ordinary suit by attachment, under laws which make no provision for the application of the proceeds of such sale to the payment of any debt, other than the one upon which the suit was
founded, and in the enforcement of which the sale was made, we
destroy the rights of our citizens who are creditors." * * * "The
doctrines of the maritime law in relation to judicial sales of libelled
vessels, are an exception to general principles. The exception is
founded not only on principles of public policy, but is entirely consistent with the most rigid justice. Such sales are not made for
the benefit of any particular creditor, but for the benefit of all persons interested. Provision is made for the distribution of the
proceeds, pro rata, among all who will come forward and establish
their claims within a given time. The proceeding is entirely in
rem, and all the world are bound by it. But what analogy is there
between such a sale as this and an ordinary sale under an ordinary
execution ? Such executions are solely for the benefit of the party
plaintiff, and can only operate upon the title of the defendant. A
sale under these merely conveys the title of the defendant in execution. The liens of strangers are not divested. If it were so,
their rights must be divested by a proceeding to which they are not
parties, of which they have no notice, and in the benefits of which
they could not participate, if they did have notice. We do not
understand, therefore, that the prior decisions of this court are
designed to embrace all judicial sales, but only such as are made
here or elsewhere, under proceedings analogous to those of Courts
of Admiralty, in which any number of claimants may unite in
libelling a vessel; and in the benefits of which not only these
claimants but all others who choose, may participate." So in the
case of Ritter vs. Steamboat Jamestown, 23 Mo. 348, a similar
view of the Louisiana statutes is taken, oud the cases of the Sea
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Bird vs. Beehler, and also of the Raritan vs. Smith, and of Fin.
ney & Lee vs. The Fayette, are commented upon and approved.
The court says, that in the last two cases, "the proceedings were
against the boat, were in rem, and a judicial sale, in such proceedings, passed the boat to the purchaser, discharged from all liens
created by law. In the case of the Sea Bird the proceedings were
not alone against the boat; they were not in rem; they were
against the boat and owners of the boat. They were not such
proceedings as admiralty courts use against vessels, and therefore
not to be controlled by the rules of such courts."
These Missouri decisions have been succinctly stated, in order
that thae difficulties which they recognize may be more distinctly
seen. Independent of the embarrassments arising from defective
legislation on the subject prior to 1845, the learned judges who
delivered the opinions cited, refer to the necessity of applying the
just rules of admiralty, in order that the rights of all persons interested may be duly respected. A careful examination of the
Louisiana Acts, and of the decisions of the Louisiana courts, it is
apprehended, will show that they are as broad in their operation,
and as careful of the rights and interests of all concerned in the
boat or vessel, as either the Illinois or Missouri Acts, and as analogous to proceedings in rem. The "privilege" referred to in the
Louisiana Code, and the commencement by "attachment with the
right of intervention," is the creation of a "lien on the price," with
the right to proceed by seizing the vessel in the first instance;
other parties in interest being permitted to intervene for the proceeds of the sale. Although the technical terms used are borrowed
from the civil law, the proceedings are almost precisely the same
as in the Missouri courts. (Arts. 3204, 2748, 2304, 3499, 8500,
of the Louisiana Code, and cases of Peyroux et al. vs. T'arion, 7
Pet. 324; Tackard vs. The Louisa, 2 Wood. & M. 49; Leland vs.
edora, ib. 98; Abat vs. .Nartique et al., 8 La. Rep. 190;
The
Shirly vs. Fabrique, 15 La. Rep. 140; Terry vs. Terry, 10 La.
Rep. 79; Lee vs. Creditors, 2 Am. La. Reg. 599 ; Scott vs. Creditors, 3 ib. 40.) If a judicial sale under the Missouri Acts divest
all liens, then a judicial sale under the equally liberal proceedings
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in the courts of Louisiana should have the same effect. There is
no difference in principle ; and nothing in the nature of the practice
requires a different rule. The views so clearly and correctly stated
by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the Sea Bird case would, if
applied to the judicial proceedings under the Missouri Boat Act,
(as limited in their operation to contracts made in the State,) lead
to the logical conclusion, that at least such lien demands as are not
cognizable in the State courts, are not divested by the judicial
sale. If an Illinois creditor cannot intervene upon an Illinois contract, which, according to the lex loci is a lien, and so with lien
creditors in other States, how can the proceedings in the Missouri
courts under the Missouri Act be considered proceedings strictly
in rem, or as having the force of admiralty sales, within the admiralty principles recognized and defined in the case of the Sea
Bird?
A Louisiana creditor is not permitted to intervene, if he desires
to do so, nor any creditor, except those presenting Missouri contracts. A proceeding in rem is "for the benefit of all interested"all may come and establish their claim to a distributive share of the'
common fund-and, therefore, "it is -entirely consistent with the
most rigid justice," and "all the world is bound by it." If those
in interest do not choose to intervene for their share of the proceeds,
their refusal or neglect should not affect the title of the purchaser
who has given full value for the vessel. But it is equally important
that the court which exercises such powers, should have the requisite
jurisdiction-that it should not be a local court, restricted in its
action by local statutes, and governed by rules utterly subversive
of the well-settled maxims of maritime jurisprudence. It should
not be compelled to ignore the rights of all persons, save those of
its own locality, and to give to home creditors exclusive privilegesdenying the liens which have grown up elsewhere than within the
territorial limits of the State-if it undertakes to enforce maritime
liens, and to be governed by admiralty principles. The demands
of foreign material men and creditors are liens by the maritime law,
within the rule of necessity, but not the claims of domestic creditors.
The aen. Smith, 4 Wh. 443; 11 Pet. 175; Prattet al. vs. Reed,
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19 How. 359. By the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri
upon the boat statute, demands in the home port are enforced to
the exclusion of all foreign demands; thus reversing the maritime
rule as laid down by the United States Supreme Court, or going
even beyond a mere reversal; for in the admiralty courts of this
country, local liens are recognized and enforced. If the doctrine
of the Missouri cases obtains in State courts, the necessary consequence must be, that each State will disregard the rights of the
citizens of all other States, and the adjudications of other State
tribunals, and a perpetual conflict will exist concerning boats and
vessels employed in the coasting trade, or upon our large western
rivers. Each State will enforce, through its own tribunals, its own
local liens in favor of its own citizens, and will disregard the liens
and rights of the citizens of all other States. If the judicial sale'
under the order of a State court, divests all liens, whether given by
the general maritime law, or by common law, or by local statutes,
and foreign creditors are prohibited from intervening; then the
same difficulties, conflicts and injuries to commerce will be reproduced, which the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
courts was expressly designed to prevent. Constitution of the
United States, Art. III, Sect. 2.
But the Missouri decisions, fairly construed, perhaps, do not
cover "maritime liens." They interpret the Missouri statute, and
declare the effect of a judicial sale under it, and also give the same
effect to other State statutes of a similar character. Although they
look to the proceedings and principles of general maritime jurisprudence for analogies to guide in the interpretation and administration
of the local law concerning vessels, and hold that local liens are
divided by judicial proceedings under the local statutes; they cannot
be considered as maintaining the doctrine that their decisions have
the force and effect of admiralty decrees. Indeed, the opinion in
the Sea Bird case clearly recognizes the distinction. The Missouri
Boat Act, and the similar statutes of other States, are not designed
to confer upon the respective State courts jurisdiction in admiralty,
nor to make the proceedings under them proceedings properly in
rem. They are not proceedings in rem, any more than the local
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proceedings in suits by attachment; although they make provisions
for the rights of other creditors besides the one who institutes the
suit and causes the seizure of the vessel. Strictly considered, there
are no suits in rem, except admiralty suits, and no courts have
admiralty jurisdiction, or jurisdiction strictly in rem, except federal
courts.
If the Missouri statute is to be construed as designed to cut off
all maritime liens, or even those it expressly recognizes, it would
certainly be inoperative to do so. But as it has been held to be
exclusively "intra-territorial" in its operation, it is evidently intended to give a lien to material men and others at the home port,
and to provide a speedier and more efficacious remedy for home
creditors. Many of the creditors embraced within its terms have
liens by the general maritime law, independent of the statute, which
could be enforced in admiralty courts. They are also permitted
to prosecute their demands, and to intervene, in the State courts;
and to that extent, have an additional remedy. That cumulative
or statutory remedy is limited, however, by the terms of the act of
1845, to six months for material men, and to three months for
seamen; the latter class of creditors being permitted to sue for only
two months' wages, and required to bring suit within thirty days
after the termination of the contract. Their common law remedy,
it is presumed, still remains. The domestic creditor of a home
vessel cannot, under that statute, proceed directly against the boat
after the expiration of six months, nor does his lien continue for a
longer period; yet his cause of action, in the ordinary form, still
remains unimpaired against the owners and parties to the contract.
His statutory right to proceed under that act, and the lien given by
it, are further limited by the proceedings and judicial sale authorized
by its terms. After a judicial sale by order of the State court
under the provisions of that statute, all prior liens created by the
act itself, together with local liens, and all right to proceed against
the boat directly for prior demands in the local court are divested.
The remedy thus given does not oust the federal courts of their
exclusive jurisdiction, nor necessarily interfere therewith. The
State proceedings are not strictly or properly proceedings in
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admiralty, or in rem, although the State courts refer to the latter
for analogies to guide them, and for principles to determine the
rights of the parties and the interpretation and obligation of the
contracts made for the boat. As Missouri creditors having maritime liens, are permitted to use that statutory remedy, the nature
of their demands must be ascertained by the rules of maritime
jurisprudence. In a suit by foreign attachment, or by the Attachment Act of Missouri, the property of the debtor is seized in the
first instance, and the levy fixes a lien; yet a sale of the property,
either pendente lite or after final judgment, passes to the purchaser
only the title of the defendant, subject to all prior incumbrances..
The incumbrancer may, in certain cases, intervene for the protection.
of his rights ; but the proceedings in the attachment suit are not.
properly in rem, although inaccurately so called-the purchaseracquires no greater rights to or in the property than the attachment
debtor had at the time. So under the Missouri Boat Act, the
judicial sale passes to the purchaser only the title of the owners,
divested of all common law and statutory liens of Missouri, but
subject to all liens existing by maritime law and fixed by the laws
of other States. Missouri has an undoubted right to determine
what liens, other than maritime, shall or shall not be recognized
with reference to chattels or chattel-interests within her territorial.
jurisdiction, and what demands shall be made to operate as a lien
upon such property; but she cannot legislate so as to oust or impair
the exclusive federal jurisdiction in admiralty, or to divest rights
vested under that jurisdiction. She cannot legislate for States
beyond her territorial jurisdiction, nor for chattels or other property
beyond her limits.
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, and every other State, have the.
same powers as Missouri, and are under no greater or less federal
restrictions, and may also enact laws to operate upon all chattels.
and real estate within their jurisdictions respectively. No one;
State can legislate for another, or determine what property laws;
shall be operative in other States. Hence the courts of each State
are governed by its legislation, both in determining the effect of
transactions or agreements within the State, and in enforcing its
19
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statutes. They proceed according to the local laws, in such cases,
and may or may not, as the local system or policy directs, permit,
by comity, the local laws of other States to be enforced through
their agency. If any citizen of Missouri has a maritime lien,
enforceable in the federal courts, and the State enacts that, in addition to the federal and to the former common law remedy, the demand
may be recovered in a more expeditious mode provided therefor by
statute, there is no necessary conflict or interference with federal
jurisdiction in admiralty, -whether the additional mode of proceeding
be under boat acts, or attachment laws, or through summary and
amended forms of proceeding by execution under judgments in
assumpsit, or debt or covenant. The additional facility is not a
negation of admiralty jurisdiction, nor an infringement upon it.
The purchaser under such judicial proceedings, knows that he takes
cum onere, and no one is injured. He can acquire no better title
than the defendant had and the State can give. The State has
made liens, and provided for their extinguishment, with a due regard
for the rights of all under the statute. The power to create has
been exercised, also, the power to limit. It has acted therein within
the clear range of its powers over the subject matter, and it cannot
act beyond. If any one of its citizens, having a maritime lien,
elects to recover his demand through the peculiar statutory proceeding, there is no more valid reason for holding that he should
not be permitted to do so, or that the whole proceeding is void for
want of jurisdiction as being within the exclusive cognizance of the
admiralty courts, than there would be for pronouncing the concurrent remedy at common law, by assumpsit, replevin or detinue, or
by attachment process, as not within tle saving clause of the ninth
section of the judiciary act; 1 U. S. Statutes at Large, 73. The
moment the demand is satisfied, either on execution or by voluntary
payment, the lien is at an end, however created. Hence, if a libellant has a demand against a Missouri boat, which is not a maritime
lien, but merely a lien created by the Missouri statute, he cannot
enforce the same in an admiralty court against the boat in the hands
of a purchaser under a judicial sale ordered by a Missouri court,
according to the boat act of 1845, if his demand accrued prior to
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said sale. If he had a maritime lien, cognizable by the State court,
he might proceed in that court or in the admiralty court, at his
option. If he did not appear in the State court and procure satisfaction of his demand, the proceedings there constitute no bar to
his recovery here, nor does the judicial sale by the order of the
State court divest his lien upon the vessel. He had an undoubted
right to pursue his clear remedy in admiralty, or his other and concurrent remedy at common law, or in the State courts. The federal courts having exclusive jurisdiction in "all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction," can alone pass, by a judicial sale in
admiralty, a title to a vessel free from all liens. Courts of common
law caninot proceed in rem, but have concurrent jurisdiction by
common law proceedings. Brevour vs. The FairAmerican, 1 Pet.
Ad. Rep. 92; 2 Brock. 130; O'Callaghanvs. Biggs, 5 Am. Law
Reg. 139; Genesee Ohief vs. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 458; 'Waringvs.
Clarke, 5 How. 441; 6 How. 344; 7 How. 729; 1 Kent, 377;
De .Lovio vs. Boit, 2 Gall. 476; Sch. Wave, 2 Paine, 131; -Davies
vs. .New Brig, Gilpin, 473; ifallet vs. .Novion, 14 John. 273;
-Percivalvs. -Hickey, 18 John. 257.
The difficulties urged upon our attention with respect to local
liens and the proceedings in State courts to enforce them, and the
embarrassments arising therefrom under the decisions in admiralty,
present very grave questions; and were these decisions now open
for review here, it might be important to consider the whole subject,
so as to arrive at some result which would obviate, as far as possible, the real or apparent conflict. The boat act of Missouri and
the proceedings under it are, by virtue of the undoubted authority
of the State to legislate with regard to common law rights and
interests in chattels, within her territorial jurisdiction. It may be
a difficult task to reconcile the recognition of a lien, not maritime,
as enforceable in admiralty against the vessel itself, with the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty courts-that is, that they may proceed, in the first instance, to enforce a mere local lien, by adjudicating the demand and decreeing the condemnation and sale of the
vessel, so that said sale shall pass a title free from all liens and
incumbrances whatsoever; and thus draw within their jurisdiction
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the adjudication of all common law demands for which a local lien
may be given by any State, and impart to those liens such force
and effect as belong solely to maritime liens. If the local law can
create a lien, and provide the mode of enforcing and divesting it,
why should not all proceedings by virtue of that local act be confined to the local tribunals ? The power to create the lien results
from the power to prescribe .rules for the transfer, mortgage, &c.,.
of chattels-a power equal, in all respects, to that over real estate
within the same territorial limits. Treating a vessel as the common
law treats it-merely as a chattel-and then considering its migratory character, and that its owners are often non-residents, the State
of Missouri has deemed it expedient to fasten liens upon it, in favor
of its own citizens, who furnish money, repairs, &c., to enable the
vessel to prosecute her voyages. In so doing, it acts upon the vessel only from the common law point of view, as an ordinary chattel.
It has no power to treat it as the admiralty courts do, or to divest
maritime liens. It can divest the liens of its own creation, and
none other. Its courts act just as courts of equity do with partnership assets in the hands of a receiver, or in marshalling equities
under a creditor's bill to funds in court; where the purchaser of the
property, sold under the order or decree, takes no better title than
the respondents could give. The boat act of 1845 provides for
marshalling its local liens and the enumerated maritime liens, and
requires those holding the local and other liens to come in and
share, according to their recognized rights, the fund in court arising
from the sale um onere. The local liens are divested, and those
having them are required to pursue the fund in court, or be remitted to their common law actions against the parties. Those having
liens under the maritime law, of the description named in the act,
may also pursue their demand against the fund, and take their distributive share, according to the rules there prescribed; or they
may elect to follow their remedies at common law or in admiralty.
To the extent that they receive satisfaction of their demands
under the statutory proceediug, their liens in admiralty, and
their rights at common law, are extiriguished; but no further.
Because they are permitted to prosecute their demands in the State
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courts, they are not precluded from enforcing them also in admiralty, or from instituting the ordinary actions therefor at common law. But if the Missouri citizen, who holds a maritime lien
which falls within the terms of that act, does not choose to pursue
it in the State court, his lien is not diverted by the sale, notwithstanding the thirteenth section, which declares that "such boat or
vessel shall, in the hands of the purchaser and his assigns, be
free and discharged from all previous liens and claims under this
act."
The language of the statute is precise, and presents no conflict;
for the liens under the maritime law are not properly liens "under, "'
or created by, that act. But how is it with a creditor having a
maritime lien, who proceeds in accordance with that act, being the
only party who obtains judgment under which a sale is ordered,
when the fund arising from the sale is not sufficient to satisfy his
demand? Shall he subsequently pursue the vessel, for the unsatisfied portion of his demand, in admiralty, and procure a condemnation and a new sale against the purchaser at the former sale ? Or,
if the funds derived from the former sale are sufficient to satisfy his
demand, and, under the subsequent proceedings in the State court,
the same is distributed among those having priority by the statute
or mere local liens, is his demand to be considered as satisfied
or unsatisfied in admiralty, and the boat again seized in the
hands of the purchaser, for the same demand upon a judgment
for which the former sale was ordered? The priorities named in
the Missouri act, are not those recognized in admiralty; and, no
doubt, it frequently happens, that those who have merely local liens
exhaust the fund, when maritime liens are actually before the court.
So the creditor having a local lien, may proceed by the ordinary
actions at common law, or as prescribed by the boat act, or in admiralty; and is he to be held concluded by his election, or permitted,
after having proceeded in the State court to judgment, to libel the
vessel in admiralty, for the original demand not satisfied out of the
proceeds of a sale thereunder? Is the demand merged in the
judgment? We are aware that there are many questions of this
character, which may hereafter arise for adjudication. Many of
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the difficulties spring from the different manner in which a vessel
is regarded at common law and in admiralty. By the former, a
judicial sale passes only the interests of the defendants, if under a
ft. fa., upon a judgment against them. If they had previously
incumbered the chattel by mortgages, or any of the modes of hypothecation known to the common or local law, the chattel would still
be subject to all of those outstanding interests, after sale on execution, just the same as would the defendants' realty, under similar
circumstances. But, as a peculiar class of liens is created by the
statute, and others may exist at common law by the acts of the
parties, the whole of those liens and incumbrances the General
Assembly of Missouri has deemed it wise to marshal, according to
rules enacted therefor, whenever the chattel has to be sold, under
judicial process, against the boat. In order, also, to prevent multiplicity of suits, and various outstanding interests in a chattel, and
a sacrifice of the vessel, and protracted litigation concerning the
respective rights of the many interests in the property sold, the
statute provides that, when a sale takes place under its provisions,
not only shall the interest of the owners pass to the purchaser, but
also the interests of all others having statutory or common law liens
or incumbrances, leaving all who have maritime liens, (save a few,)
wholly untouched, and granting to the excepted few permission to
come in and share the proceeds. If the statutory liens, like common
law incumbrances, were left to be enforced solely by the local or
common law courts, or were cognizable in admiralty, like mortgages,
only as against remnants and surplus, some of the embarrassments
suggested might be obviated. Now, by adjudications, and by the
rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, any one
having merely a local lien may libel a vessel, and proceed in rem
in admiralty, upon that local lien, to condemnation and sale. The
General Smith, 4 Wh. 443; New Jersey Steam Nfavigation Company vs. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 390; Bead vs. Hull of .New
Brig, 1 Story, 224; 11 Pet. 175, rule 12th. The local law, without which the federal court would not, and could not act in admiralty upon the specified demand, is made to give a new sweep to
federal jurisdiction, drawing within the vortex of admiralty the ad-
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judication of common law and local demands, to be governed by
other than the common law and statutory modes of proceeding.
Instead of federal courts having exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty,
and stopping where maritime demands and rights in admiralty stop,
they take jurisdiction of local liens, and (by virtue of local enactments) not of maritime subjects merely, which are governed by
rules of universal application, but of the various conflicting statutory and other regulations of the States; and then do not follow
and enforce those State laws, but modify some of the provisions,
disregard others, and balance the clashing rules of the local
system of one State against those of another; until what was
designed for a court of admiralty, whose decrees should be based
upon maxims of universal recognition, and common to all civilized
maritime countries, becomes a strange anomaly; exercising jurisdiction as varied as admiralty, common law and State legislation, and
as irreconcilable as the many differing statutes of the various States
at whose ports a vessel may touch, in the course of her many voyages. Admiralty courts cease thereby to derive their jurisdiction
solely from the federal constitution and laws, and to be guided by
admiralty rules, but virtually assume and exercise jurisdiction, as
the same may be enlarged or diminished by mere State legislation,
without the possibility of uniform proceedings with respect to the
whole union or harmony of federal action. Each case dependent
on a local lien, has a law for itself. The furnishing supplies to a
vessel touching at one port, will give a lien to be enforced in admiralty by United States courts, when precisely similar contracts,
made under like circumstances in all respects at another port, will
carry no right to cognizance by those courts.
Such considerations as these might have been urged with great
force and propriety, if the questions they present were open for
review or adjudication in this court. The conflicts and difficulties
that frequently arise from different systems of jurisprudence, and
from different principles belonging to even the same system, and
often involved in the same facts submitted for adjudication, are incidental to all judicial proceedings. No argument therefrom will
justify this court in departing from the rules formally settled by
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the United States Supreme Court. It is too late to question in this
court, at this time, the existence of the rule which confines maritime
liens to foreign vessels, or that recognizes in admiralty local and
common law liens, or that holds the ports of different States foreign
to each other. The General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 438; St. Jago de
Cuba, 9 id. 409; N. T Steam Navigation Company vs. Merchants
Bank, 6 How. 390; 11 Peters, 175; Thomas et al. vs. 08born,
19 id. 22.
Whether a fuller consideration of the whole subject, and a more
systematic adjustment of these questions, would produce a change
of some of the existing rules, it is not for this court to determine.
After a long controversy, it has been settled that the grant in
the constitution is neither limited to, nor to be interpreted by, what
were cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England when the United
States constitution was adopted; that admiralty jurisdiction is not
taken away in cases where courts of common law may have concurrent jurisdiction ; that exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is conferred
on the United States courts; that it is not limited to tide waters,
but extends to all public navigable lakes and rivers where commerce
is carried on between different States or with a foreign nation; that
it does not exist for the enforcement of the rights of mortgagees;
that, in cases of collision, rules of navigation prescribed by the laws
of a State, though binding upon the courts of that State, cannot
regulate the decisions of the federal courts administering the general
admiralty law; when repairs or supplies are procured by the master
in a foreign port, in a case of necessity, and the credit has necessarily to be given to the vessel, or it is necessary to rely on the credit
of the vessel, a maritime lien therefor exists; a mortgagee may be a
claimant, or intervene for proceeds of a sale, but cannot libel the
vessel for the mortgage debt; that no maritime lien exists for supplies furnished in a home port, but if given by the municipal law,
they will be taken cognizance of and enforced in admiralty, and a
libel may be filed therefor, and proceedings maintained against the
ship and freight in rem, or against the master or the owner alone
in personam. Wa'ing et al. vs. Clark, 5 How. 441; N. J. Steam
Nav. Co. vs. Merchants Bank, 6 id. 344; Te Propeller Genesee
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Chief vs. Pitzhugh et al., 12 id. 443; Fretz et al. vs. Ball et al.,
12 id. 466; Steamer New World et al. vs. .King, 16 id. 469;
Bogart et al. vs. Steamer John Jay, 17 id. 399; Steamboat New
York et al. vs. Rea et al., 18 id. 225; Thomas et al. vs. Osborn,
19 id. 22 ; Pratt et al. vs. Reed, 19 id. 359 ; Tod et al.vs. Steamer
Sultana, 19 id. 362; The General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 443; Peyroux vs. Howard, 7 Peters, 324; 12th Rule of Supreme Court in
Admiralty.
The jurisdiction of the United States courts is, therefore, not
restricted by the narrow rules existing in England at the adoption
of the United States Constitution. Those restrictions resulted
from the conflict there between the admiralty and common law
courts, which ousted the admiralty courts of jurisdiction over maritime contracts in home ports. The doctrine of the United States
Supreme Court follows the English rule, however, so far as to deny
that a maritime lien exists for supplies or repairs furnished in a
home port, instead of acting upon the more extended and general
rule of the civil law, which recognizes no distinction between the
home and foreign port in such cases. Abbott on Shipping, 142.
It then recognizes and enforces municipal liens given in home ports
by State statutes. Thus the one rule cuts off the domestic creditor;
and the other brings him back within admiralty cognizance, it may
be with rights superior to the foreign creditor, who has a maritime
lien; for the Supreme Court has expressly withheld all expression
of opinion as to the rule of necessity, with reference to municipal
liens. Pratt et al. vs. Reed, 19 How. 359. When the Supreme
Court decided in the case of The Gen. Smith, that no maritime lien
exists for supplies, &c., furnished in the home port, but that municipal liens would be recognized and enforced, the various States had
to adopt statutes creating such municipal liens in order to protect
their own creditors, and place them on equal footing with foreign
creditors. If the civil law doctrine had been adopted, instead of
the English, there would have been no- distinction between the home
and foreign port as to the rights of material men and others, and
there would probably have been no necessity for a recognition of
ninicipal liens, except as against remnants and surplus, just as with
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mortgages. Municipal liens might have been treated as on the
same footing with mortgages and other common law incumbrances.
The adoption of the civil law rule, or that the various States of the
Union are not foreign to each other within the maritime doctrine,
might remedy some of the difficulties named. If no such distinction existed between liens in home and foreign ports, there would
be very little, if any necessity for the boat acts of the different
States; and then a refusal to give to municipal statutory liens any
better standing in admiralty than a mortgage or other common law
incumbrance, would probably go far to establish uniformity in the
maritime jurisprudence of the United States, and to remove the
embarrassments suggested. Under the various rules now authoritatively established in this country, it frequently happens that a.
vessel is libelled in a home port, on a home demand, by virtue of
the local lien given by statute, and condemned and sold; and that,
on the final adjudication of the rights of libellants, claimants, and
intervenors, not one maritime lien is presented for consideration, or
really exists ; yet the admiralty court has taken cognizance of and
enforced only municipal liens, without having had any other jurisdiction than what sprung from local State legislation. In such instances, it is virtually turned into a tribunal to dispose of purely
common law demands, arising from local legislation, which more appropriately belong to local tribunals. And whilst passing upon
home demands against a domestic vessel, it often occurs that other
demands are interposed, resting for their validity solely upon the
legislation of other States. The circumstances under which such
liens are fixed by State legislation, and the limitations upon them,
are very different. Thus, in Ohio, the demand has to be duly recorded within four months, and then the lien continues for two
years. In Louisiana, in some cases recording is necessary, and in
others not necessary; some demands are limited to sixty days, and
others to departure on the second voyage. In Missouri no recording is required, but under the act of 1855, seamen's demands are
restricted to wages for two months, and the right to pursue the boat
therefor, by name, is limited to thirty days; whilst material men
can enforce their dem inds on accouqts for a year after the accruing
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ot iue last item, except that in St. Louis county, (where most of
those demands arise,) the limitation or right to sue the boat is six
months; thus seamen who are favored in admiralty are restricted
by the local law, and different rules exist for residents of different
counties, working the greatest injustice among citizens even of the
same State. The different local statutes prescribe different rules of
preference and of priority; and the judicial interpretation of them
by the State courts of last resort is guided by analogies from different systems of jurisprudence-one local court looking to the maritime system, and another to the common law system. Here, in
Missouri, the earlier adjudications upon the statute followed the
common law rules, giving to a prior attachment, when levied, preference over the statutory liens ; and to the statutory lien under which
the vessel was first seized, preference over liens declared to be
superior by the statute itself; but when a fuller boat act was adopted
in 1845, the maritime law was held to be the proper source for rules
of interpretation. As the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court prior to the case of The Genesee Chief, limited admiralty
jurisdiction to tidal waters, the vast commerce of the western
States, inter sese, and with foreign nations, was left, so far as boats
and vessels were employed within the territorial limits of the respective States, to be governed by common law rules, or such local
statutes as might be, from time to time, adopted for the purpose of
enforcing the rights of parties. As no State could exercise, or
confer on its own courts the power to exercise admiralty jurisdiction,' the various, statutes and adjudications under them became
more and more restricted in their beneficial operations, until they
were confined to creditors resident in each State respectively. The
local courts, like those of Missouri, were consequently embarrassed
in deciding many cases before them; for, having no power to proceed in rem, they often felt the necessary injustice done creditors
resident elsewhere, but with no authority to apply with full force
the wiser maritime rules which give proper effect to the maritime
demands of all persons, wherever residing. Under those local
statutes conflicts of jurisdiction necessarily arose. Vessels sold
under the order of a State court were not and could not be divested
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of maritime liens, nor of liens existing in other States; and consequently the purchasers at those judicial sales were controlled in
their bids by the legal fact, that they were acquiring the property
cum onere,-subject to all tacit and other liens which might exist
against it at each port in every other State where the vessel had
touched, it might be, during her lifetime. The decision in The
Genesee Chief opened the door to the navigating interests of the
West, for relief from a large portion of the burthens under which
they had suffered. Still the early rule established in the case of
The General Smith is in full force; and the necessity for local
statutes to protect home creditors is not removed. Those statutes
still remain.
Under the concurrent jurisdiction at common law, a vessel may
be seized and sold to satisfy a judgment rendered against the owner,
or the proceeds may be distributed according to the statutory rules
governing the local courts; or it may be brought within the cognizance of said courts on their equity side; yet, according to the well
settled doctrines on both sides of those courts, the judgments and
decrees bind only the parties thereto and their privies, and the
vessel being made "to plough the seas, and not rot by the wall," is
soon beyond the territorial jurisdiction of those tribunals and subject
to demands not cut off or concluded by the judgments or decrees
thus rendered. From the very nature of the case, owners, mortgagees, lien creditors, and others having an interest in the thing
sold, could not be personally served with a summons or subpoena
within the State, because they were residents of the various Western
States at whose ports the vessel had touched, and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any one local tribnnal. In admiralty courts
alone, the power existed to make all the world parties to the proceedings. Similar embarrassments may arise in common law suits
and in equity proceedings, it is true, with respect to other chattels;
yet many of those conflicts have been settled by a long series of
adjudications. It is impossible to adjudicate, in one suit, all points
that may arise from the concurrent jurisdiction of admiralty and
common law tribunals; nor would any court be guilty of an attempt
to do so. In the cases now before this court for adjudication, and
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intended to be covered by this decision, some of these difficulties
have arisen; and it has been thought proper therefore to present
more at length than is usual, the source of the conflicts, the nature
of the questions involved, and the principles by which they are
governed. This has been done the more cheerfully, because the
growing litigation in Western admiralty courts requires that the
doctrines involved, and the nature of the system, should be understood at an early day. This department of jurisprudence has not
received so large a share of professional attention in the interior
States as in those having tidal waters; because, until the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in 1851, it was held that the
general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of United States courts
did not extend above tide water on the Mississippi river. A careful
examination of the maritime codes as interpreted by admiralty
courts, will also indicate the necessity, in some cases, of a very
different application of their established principles to river navigation in the West. Rules that grew up under ocean navigation and
concerning sea voyages, may sometimes be found inapplicable with
technical rigor to voyages along the navigable rivers of the Mississippi valley. With the increase of western population and productions, a corresponding increase of western commerce must occur.
Hence the magnitude of the interests and of suits concerning river
navigation, will continue to add to the practical importance of the
various questions decided in the admiralty courts. Unfortunately,
only a few, comparatively, of the many cases hitherto have involved
sums large enough to authorize an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court; and hence the various district and circuit courts
are without the advantages which decisions by the court of last
resort would afford. The decisions of the various district and
circuit courts are, with few exceptions, unknown, and inaccessible
to the profession generally, and to other courts. With a full appreciation, therefore, of the arguments of the able advocates in the
cases under consideration, and of the necessity of educing from
general principles of the maritime law some of the rules applicable
to the facts, and with due regard at the same time to the decisions
obligatory here as settled by the United States Supreme Court, this
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opinion has been more extended in its consideration of the views
urged upon our attention than under other circumstances would
have been deemed necessary. The conclusions at which this court
has arrived, may be briefly stated, as follows:
There can be no lien by the general maritime law for materials
and supplies furnished a vessel in her home port.
Whether a vessel is foreign or domestic must be determined by
the residence of her owners, and her enrollment is onlyprizafacie
evidence of their residence.
If a vessel is navigated by charterers, and by the terms of the
charter party they have exclusive control of her,-directing her
voyages, receiving the freight money, manning and victualling her,
&c.,-then they are to be deemed, pro hae vice, the owners for the
purpose of ascertaining the home port where she is libelled for supplies furnished to run her.
The jurisdiction of the United States courts in all civil cases in
admiralty is exclusive of the several State courts; and the latter
have the jurisdiction of only the appropriate common law remedies.
A lien given by the general maritime law cannot be divested by
the legislature of a State.
The Boat Act of Missouri cannot, and does not, deprive a person
who has a lien under the general maritime law, of the right to
enforce that lien in the United States courts.
The acts of the various States creating municipal liens,-providing, as many of them do, for their enforcement in suits instituted
against the vessels, by name, instead of against the owners, prescribing, too, the modes of proceding therein and of divesting those
municipal liens, declaring the rules of priority among domestic
creditors, ordering the sale of the vessel and the appearance of the
specified lien creditors to urge their demands against the proceeds
when brought into the State courts, do not make those proceedings
properly suits in rem or give to those courts admiralty powers or
jurisdiction. Hence, the judicial sales made under such acts by the
order of State courts, divest only the liens created by those acts and
the municipal liens embraced within their terms. The purchaser in
such cases takes, cum onere as to existing maritime liens, and as to
the municipal liens of other States.
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A decree and sale in admiralty alone can pass, judicially, a title
to a vessel, discharged of all liens and incumbrances whatsoever.
Where the place of an owner's residence is substantially suburban
to, or a part of the port where a vessel is enrolled, and he does his
business or the business of the vessel at the port of enrollment, then
the port of enrollment is to be deemed the home port of the vessel,
although the residence of her owner is tecbnically on the other side
of a river separating two States and the two parts of the same port.
For the purpose of determining whether Cincinnati was the home
port of the Ambassador at the time the demand accrued, it is sufficient that she was enrolled there, and that her owner, although
residing on the other side of the ferry, in Newport, Kentucky, did
his business and the business of the vessel in Cincinnati.
As the libellants' account was not sworn to and recorded, as prescribed by the Ohio statute, it is not a municipal lien under the
laws of that State.
Courts of admiralty have no general equity powers, and will not
take cognizance of undefined equities, or of the rights of general
creditors.
The distinction between demands accruing for materials and supplies furnished in a home port, and when furnished in a foreign
port ; the rule that the ports of the different States are foreign to
each other, within the operation of the maritime law; and the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, in cases founded solely upon municipal
liens; and the power of such courts to pass upon the claim of a
mortgagee, and order the proceeds of a sale in admiralty to be paid
over to him, although he is not permitted to libel the boat for the
payment of the mortgage money-thepe rules are not open for
review in a U. S. District or Circuit Court, nor will those courts go
behind the decisions andrules of the U. S. Supreme Court, because
difficulties and embarrassments may arise from their application.
The Missouri boat act provides for only a legitimate exercise by
its courts of their concurrent jurisdiction at common law over
demands accruing in the navigation of boats and vessels. The fact
that, in addition to the ordinary forms of suits at common law, Missouri has adopted a form of proceeding whereby a warrant is issued
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against the boat, in the first instance, and a suit is maintained
against her by name, and also providing that Missouri creditors,
who have a general maritime lien, may prosecute their demands
under that act, does not interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of
the U. S. courts in admiralty, so as to render said act unconstitutional. An additional remedy at common law does not oust admiralty courts of their exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty.
Whether the adoption of the rule of the civil law, with respect to
supplies, &c., in the home port, or of any other rule different from
what the U. S. Supreme Court has laid down, would be more consistent with the general maritime law, produce less conflict or difficulty, secure more uniformity, and enforce more wisely the just
rights of parties, is a fit subject for the consideration of that court;
but so long as those rules are adhered to by that tribunal, inferior
courts must apply and enforce them.
Municipal liens, within the terms of the Missouri statute, are
divested by a judicial sale under that statute, and cannot thereafter
be pursued in admiralty.
As some of the points considered in this opinion were, as before
stated, elaborately discussed by the learned judge of the District
Court, from whose decisions appeals were taken, and as he reviewed
with great care and accuracy most of the U. S. statutes, and of the
adjudicated cases bearing upon the questions involved (5 Am. Law
Register, 142, Bill & Conn vs. The Golden Gate, and Ashbrook
et al. vs. The Same, page 148), and as this court fully concurs
with him in his views as thus expressed, it has been deemed proper
to avoid a repetition of the arguments and authorities cited by him,
as far as practicable, and merely to present some additional suggestions corroborative of his conclusions.
The decrees in each of the cases before this court are, therefore,
in all respects, affirmed, with costs.

RUNYAN vs. REED.

In the District Court for Philadelphia County, December, 1857.
RUNYAN

vs. REED.

1. Payment of a promissory note by the maker before maturity does not extinguish
it as against a bona fide holder, without notice.
2. When a note has been paid by the maker before maturity, his indorsement would

be notice of that fact to the holder.
3. But such indorsement is not itself evidence of payment.

It is, 'when standing

unexplained, evidence that the indorsements prior to the name of the maker were
for his accommodation.

The facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
court.
MrM.George W. Biddle, for the plaintiff.
Messrs. Mitcheson and G. X. Wharton, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARISWOOD, P. J.-This was an action against the defendants asindorsers of a promissory note drawn by Osmon Reed in favor of"
James L. Whetham, dated Nov. 22, 1856, at six months, for $600,.
The note and notarial protest were given in evidence; by which it
appeared that when the note matured, and payment was demanded;.
the indorsements, besides that of Whetham, the payee, were "1IsaacReed & Son, (the present defendants,) Osmon Beed, George- K.
Childs and M. J. Runyan," (the plaintiff.) Before giving the notein evidence, the plaintiff's counsel at the bar struck out all the in- dorsements subsequent to that of Isaac Reed and Son, the defendants. A verdict was taken for the plaintiff for the amount of the
note, and the question was reserved, whether upon this evidencethe plaintiff was entitled to recover.
The striking out the indorsements by the plaintiff, at the trial,.
ought not to prevent the defendant from taking advantage, as matter'
of defence, of the fact that the indorsements thus stricken, out were.
20
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theie, if they are evidence from which a defence may be inferred.
We may assume, also, upon the common presumption that Osmon
Reed the maker, and Osmon Reed the indorser, were the same
person. Perhaps, also, as against the plaintiff producing the note,
the presumption is, that the handwriting of Osmon Reed, the indorser, is genuine. It is unnecessary to decide that point here, but
certainly if the plaintiff had been sued as indorser by a subsequent
holder, his indorsement would have been an admission of the genuineness of all the signatures preceding his own. The fact also unquestionably appears from the protest that Osmon Reed's name was
indorsed, and the plaintiff became the holder of the note, before it
matured.
It may be conceded as settled that if the note, after it had been
executed and delivered, so as to be an available security against the
maker, had been paid by him, or if he had bought it in the market,
he could not re-issue it, so as to revive the liability of any other
party, who had been thereby discharged, unless indeed in the hands
of a bona fide holder before maturity, and without knowledge that it
had been so paid. Beck vs. Bobley, 1 H. Black. 89, n. "I
agree," says Lord Ellenborough, "that a bill paid at maturity cannot be re-issued, and that no action can afterwards be maintained
upon it by a subsequent endorsee. A payment before it becomes
due, however, I think does not extinguish it, any more than if it
were merely discounted. A contrary doctrine would add anew clog
to the circulation of bills and notes; for it would be impossible to
know whether there had not been an anticipated payment of them.
It is the duty of bankers to make some memorandum on bills and
notes, which have been paid, and if they do not, the holders of such
securities cannot be affected by any payment made before they are
due." Burbridge vs. Manners, 8 Campb. 193; Byles on Bills,
133,; Story on Prom. Notes, §§ 180, 384.
If then a note be paid or taken up by the maker at or after maturity, it cannot be re-issued so as to render any of the indorsers
upon it liable without their eonsent. If paid or taken up by the
maker before maturity, a subsequent indorsee who takes it bona fide
and for a valuable consideration, may recover upon it: unless at the
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time he received it, he hadknowledge or notice of the fact of such
payment.
If then the legal inference from the indorsement of Osmon Reed
is that the note was paid or bought by him after it had been originally put in circulation, the plaintiff ought not to be allowed to hold
this verdict. The name of Osmon Reed was on the note as indorser
when she took it. She had notice of all that the law infers from
that fact. The question then is reduced to this ; was the indorsement evidence of the fact of such payment or purchase ?
What was the legal effect of this indorsement made by the maker
under these circumstances ? It was not necessary in order to pass
the title. The note had already been indorsed in blank, and was
now practically payable to bearer. Supposing Osmon Reed to have
become possessor of the note by payment or purchase he could have
passed it by simple delivery. The indorsement did not vary Osmon
Reed's liability as maker. It did not convert his absolute promise
into a conditional one only. What then was its effect ? If it had
any use or effect whatever it was to operate as an admission by him
as maker that the signatures of the indorsers then on the note were
genuine. In this respect it may have been valuable to the subsequent holders when they should come to proceed against Osmon
Reed as maker.
What then can we infer from the indorsement more than the fact
that at the time he put his name on the back of the note, Osmon
Reed was in possession of the instrument-in lawful possession ?
Does it necessarily follow that he had title-paid or bought it? It
may be primafacie evidence that he then owned it, or, which is the
same thing, had authority to dispose Qf it; but not that it had
already been in circulation, and that he had anticipated its payment.
Possession by him after maturity would be evidence that he had paid
it; but before maturity the presumption, in the first instance, is,
that it has not been paid. Without evidence of such payment by
anticipation, the law will presume rather that he holds possession as
the agent of or for the use of the holder, or that the note has been
indorsed by the parties, wh se names are then on it, for his accommodation. Suppose Osmon Reed's name had not been indorsed,
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and suppose that the defendants here had proved by witnesses that
the plaintiff purchased this note of Osmon Reed the maker, knowing him to be the maker, and paid into his hands the money for it,
would that evidence have precluded her recovery? The authorities
are very clear that it would not. It would have been evidence that
the note had been indorsed for the maker's accommodation, and so
far as that fact might form an element of any defence, the possession by the maker of an indorsed note is sufficient primafacie not
only to affect the holder with notice, but to prove the fact itself.
Parke vs. Smith, 4 W. & S. 289; Wallace vs. Branch Bank, 1
Alabama, 565; Mauldin vs. Branch Bank, 2 Alabama, 502.
In these cases and others which may be found cited in them, the
note either expressly on its face was for value received, or such was
the implication of law. Prima facie every negotiable bill or note is
so. Prima facie the note sued on was a business note-given for
value. But when, after it has been indorsed by the payee, it is put
in circulation by the maker, that presumption is rebutted and a new
presumption arises that the indorser or indorsers have given their
names for the maker's accommodation, and have authorized him to
offer it for discount. Common experience is the mother of presumption; and common experience is all in favor of the doctrine
that possession by the maker of indorsed paper, before maturity, is
evidence, not of premature payment, but of want of consideration.
It would lay the axe at the root of accommodation paper, according
to the present mode of business, to hold that whenever a note is
taken from the maker the indorser is discharged, unless the holder
could prove affirmatively in reply that it was an accommodation note.
Such would be practically the result of deciding that mere possession by the maker is evidence of payment.
We think the indorsement by itself is evidence of nothing beyond
the fact of such possession. It may be argued that when he indorsed the note, the maker assumed to be the owner by transferring
it. But certainly no more than by delivery, which would just as
effectually have transferred it, inasmuch as it was indorsed in blank.
If it was an accommodation note, he was the owner of it. Such
paper is a loan to the maker, of the eredit of the indorser and an-
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thorizes him to use it for any purpose for which negotiable business
paper may be used. Appleton vs. Donaldson,3 Barr, 381. 1 Credit
the drawer" was formerly written and signed by the indorser on the
face of such notes, intended to be offered for discount at banks.
Otherwise, in order that the proceeds should pass to the credit of
the maker, he must indorse his name, or procure the check of the
indorser for the amount. It is understood that the banks have for
many years refused to discount notes thus bearing upon their face
evidence of their fictitious character. "Credit the drawer" is what
every accommodation indorser says, who places the note in the hands
of the maker. The amount of such paper however, actually offered
and discounted has not been in the least diminished by merely changing the form in which it is done. The maker in all cases of this
character exercises full power over the note; he does, in fact, transfer it, though he may not place his name on the back of it. Why,
then, shall the holder, receiving it from the hands of the makerpurchasing it from him-paying him the money for it-be allowed
to recover, while with only the addition of his name on the backwhether innocently or maliciously placed there-he shall lose his
security? It would be to make a distinction where there is no difference in fact or in principle.
If the defendants here had proved that in point of fact after the
note was put in circulation, Osmon Reed paid it or bought it in the
market, then the circumstance that his name was on the back of the
note would have been sufficient to have affected the plaintiff with
notice. It was out of the usual course of a business transaction,
and therefore enough to put her on inquiry as to what was the true
state of the case. But the defendants have offered no evidence of
payment in fact. Is the burthen of proving payment upon them or
upon the plaintiff? The defendants insist that the indorsement
alone is sufficient prima facie evidence of payment. Unless that is
so, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment upon the verdict. It has not
been made out either upon principle, or by authority, to our satisfaction, and, therefore, we discharge this rule for a new trial, and.
enter judgment for the plaintiff upon the point reserved.

BANK OF PITTSBURG vs. DAVIS.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,1858.
APPEAL BY THE BANK OF PITTSBURG IN THE MATTER OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUND ARISING FROM THE SALE OF STORE AND LOT OF
ROBERT DAVIS.

A was the owner of three properties, numbered respectively 295, 297, 299, upon
which there were apportioned liens in favor of B, who was a creditor of A's by

being a holder of thirteen notes, for which the liens were held as security, twelve
of the notes being unpaid; there was a sheriff's sale of No. 299, the proceeds of
which were paid exclusively to creditors other than B; Nos. 295, 297, were then

sold at sheriff's sale: held, that B might claim his whole debt from the fund
arisingfrom the sale of the latter, the security and not the debt being apportioned.

WOODWARD, J.-The bank, by entering the mechanics' lien which
it held by assignment from the Pattersons, acquired a record security
for the thirteen notes of Davis, which it had discounted for the
Pattersons, and then held under their indorsement.
These notes constituted the debt which Davis owed, and which
the bank was entitled to receive-a debt which arose out of an
entire contract for the building of the three store houses, and which
had not been apportioned by any act of the parties, among the
several buildings.
But the record security for the debt had been apportioned, $8,000
to each store, not by virtue of anything in the contract of the
parties, but by force of the statute regulating mechanics' liens.
The 13th section of the Act of 16th June, 1836, provides that the
"person filing a joint claim" against two or more buildings owned
by the same person, shall designate the amount which he claims to
be due to him on each of such buildings. In pursuance of this
enactment, the bank claimed a lien for $3,000 on each of the three
buildings, together amounting to $9,000, and on the face of the
record, the liens were valid for these sums. Yet the real debt was
not so much. The aggregate of the thirteen notes was only
$6,214 66, and the bank's claim was never more than this sum.
Creditors often hold security liens for more than is due, and they
have a right to hold them until the real debt is paid.
And where they have several liens for the same debt, or parts of
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the same debt, they have a right to enforce either or all of them,
until the actual debt is paid. But the bank's real debt was further
reduced by Davis's payment at its maturity, of the first of the
thirteen notes, $500, which left due to the bank, without interest,

$5,714 66.
Now such was the state of facts, three record liens of $3,000 each,
to secure the payment of $5,714 66, when on the 25th July, 1853,
one of the properties bound, lot No. 299, was sold at sheriff's sale.
This divested one of the bank's liens, and no part of the proceeds
went to the bank, but were all paid to other creditors.
Why the bank claimed no part of the proceeds is not very apparent,
but most probably because no other of the notes they held had fallen
due, they did not know but Davis would take them up as fast as
they matured, and at any rate, their liens on the two remaining lots,"
297 and 295, were ample indemnity for all that would grow due.
Whether these were their reasons or not, it is certain that the
first sheriff's sale left them in possession of two unimpaired liens of
$3,000 each, to secure a debt not yet due, of less than $6,000. In
this condition of the record, Richard Hope, the appellee, became a
judgment creditor of Davis on the 14th October, 1853, and on the
27th November, 1856, store-house and lot No. 297, were sold at
sheriff's sale, on process of Nancy Whitaker, and the proceeds,
$6,876 67, brought into court for distribution.
The bank, all of the remaining Davis notes being now due and
unpaid, appeared and claimed out of these proceeds, one-half of its
real debt, amounting at the time of distribution, to $2,654 68,
reserving the other half to be satisfied out of its remaining lien of

$3000, on lot No. 295.
To this claim on the part of the bank, Hope objects, on the ground
that a third of the bank's debt should have been paid out of the
proceeds of the former sale, and that only a third of it can be claimed
out of the present fund. He admits that he was not a lien creditor
at the time of the first sale, and that no part of the proceeds of the
last sale can in any event reach his judgment, but he conceives that
if one-third of the bank debt can be constructively extinguished, on
the ground that it was not claimed when it ought to have been,
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the judgment creditors who are prior to him will be so far paid out
of the fund now in court, as materially to improve his own prospeets
in reference to a future sale of the remaining lot No. 295.
Nobody who is entitled to participate in the fund now for distribution, objects to the bank's taking one-half of its debt, nor does
Davis, the debtor, object. Nor has Hope, the only objecting creditor, any interest in that fund. Yet the court below, at his instance,
set aside the auditor's report, allowing the bank one-half of its claim,
and decreed that the bank should receive but one-t ird of its claim
out of the present fund.
It might be well doubted, whether Hope's interest was not too remote
and speculative to entitle him to come in and interfere with the distribution of a fund, to not a dollar of which he lays claim; but we prefer
to place our judgment on other and more solid ground.
We have already indicated that ground by treating the notes in
the bank's hands as the principal debt, and the apportioned lien as
the accessory security, subject to the limitation, $3,000 to each lot,
the bank had the clear right to use every part of the security for
the satisfaction of the debt. It could extract no more than $3,000
of the debt from any one of the lots, because such was the extent
and limitation of its lien, but within that sum its rights could be
questioned only by prior lien creditors; suppose the real debt of the
bank had been reduced to $3,000, the record remaining as it was
first made up, and all the lots sold at sheriff's sales at different
periods, is it to be doubted that the bank would be at liberty to
take satisfaction out of whichever sale it chose?
If I hold several securities for one and the same debt, miy I not
avail myself of either to obtain satisfaction ? That I may, has been
so often decided, as to make it text law. But if each security is
partial, though the aggregate is more than sufficient to cover the
debt, the principle is still applicable. Mly release of one, or neglect
to enforce it, to the prejudice of no existing rights, impairs not my
hold on the other securities. Partial releases of mortgage securities
were at one time attended with difficulties in Pennsylvania, but an
Act of Assembly removed them long ago, and now a mortgagee
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having a mortgage on several tracts of land, impairs not his lien on
one of the tracts by releasing another. If the legislation was
limited to such securities, it was because others stood in no need of
it. It was never doubted, that a creditor who held three chattels
in pledge for his debt, might without risk to his remaining securities,
give up one and retain two. And where this is done for the benefit
of the debtor and all of his lien creditors, it would seem hardly
reasonable or just to punish the pledgee at the instance of a subsequent creditor, with the loss of one-third of his debt, though the two
remaining chattels were ample to satisfy it. Of course, counsel
looked for no authority to sustain such a proposition, or if they did,
none was found. And yet the ruling below rested on no better
foundation. Here there was in reality no release of securities by
the bank, but only a failure to assert its claim on a particular fund.
And whom did that prejudice? Not Davis, the debtor, because
these proceeds went to satisfy debts that were harrassing him, instead
of the bank's debt, which was not then due, nor the lien creditor's,
because it let them in upon the fund, to the extent to which the
claim of the bank, had it been asserted, would have excluded them.
Then why should the bank's forbearance be construed into an
extinguishment of one-third of its debt? In looking through the
reasons assigned by the learned judge, we fail to perceive anything
that is satisfactory on this point. He answers successfully the
argument of counsel in regard to the appropriation of the payments
made.
I agree entirely with him that the payments were made generally,
on the entire contract, and applied as made. The questions here
do not depend on the equitable doctrino which regulates the application of partial payments, but upon the rights of creditors under
statutory liens. That doctrine has no application to the case.
But the conclusion of the learned judge, that "the bank was
bound to look to thc proceeds o the sale of that lot, (No. 299) for
its proportion of the balance the-i due upon the whole lien," strikes
us as a non sequitur.
It was inaccurate to speak of . balance then due the bank, for
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the only one of the thirteen notes which had then matured, had been
paid and taken up by Davis, and there was nothing due the bank at
Athe time of the first sale.
But the greater error of this conclusion is, that it treats the bank's
as an apportioned debt-one-third of it charged on each lot. I
repeat, that it was the lien, the security that was apportioned, not
the debt. The debt was as entire as ever, or if it be regarded as
broken, it was not into three parts, corresponding with the liens,
but into the thirteen notes.
The best view of these notes, however, is that they were only
appointments of the times of payment fixed for the entire debt.
Together, they constituted the debt which the bank was entitled to
receive. As further security for the same debt, the bank held the
three liens. Each of these was good for $3,000 of that debt, and
the two last were none the worse, because the first had produced
nothing.
The present claim of the bank is for a sum within the lien divested
by the last sale; the record was notice to all parties of the bank's
right to assert that lien, for an amount not exceeding 63,000; and
therefore the portion of the fund claimed by the bank, should have
been allowed.
And now, to wit, 4th January, 1858, this appeal having been
argued by counsel and fully considered by the court, it is ordered
that the decree of the District Court bf Allegheny county be reversed
and set aside, and that of the fund in court, the sum of $2,654 68
be, and the same is hereby decreed to be paid to the appellant; that
the residue of said fund be distributed to the other lien creditors,
according to their priority, and that the cost of this appeal be paid
by the appellee.

WILLIAMS vs. COWARD.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1858.
WILLIAMS AND WIFE VS. COWARD AND WIFE.

In an action on a contract made between two married women after coverture, the
husbands alone must sue and be sued: the use of the husband's name is a mis-

joinder.

The facts fully appear in the opinion of the court, which was
delivered by
J.-A married woman can neither sue nor be sued
on her contract made during coverture. If she contract for necessaries or for goods that go to the use of her husband, the law presumes
her to be his agent, and treats the contract as his, and the suit must
be against him alone. It is only when an action is brought on her
ante-nuptial contract that she is to be joined as a co-plaintiff or defendant with her husband. Mortz vs. Bulter, 1 Watts 229, and this
because in case of the husband's death the action must survive.
But an action on a contract between two married women made after
coverture, neither wife should be joined. If any right of action
accrued, it belongs to the husband of the one wife, and whatever
liability is created, attached to the husband of the other. Though
the wives may have created the cause of war, they are to be regarded
as the ministers of their lords, and the battle is to be fought by
them single handed.
These rules and principles were all violated in the case before us.
Mrs. Coward deposited moneys with Mrs. Williams to the amount
of $600, and drew upon her for various sums until the balance was
reduced to $143 59 which, with $22 interest claimed, amounting to
$165 50, are the moneys for which this suit is brought.
The plaintiff's counts all charge an assumpsit by Moses Williams
and -Elizabeth his wife vs Perry Coward and Ann his wife, and
the plaintiffs had a verdict and judgment. There is nothing in the
common law of the marriage relations, and nothing in the statutory
modification of it to justify such misjoinders, and the judgment is
accordingly reversed, and restitution awarded of the moneys collected on the execution.
WOODWARD,

